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Ⅲ.3 Chapter 3: Other policies meant to promote patents  
 
Ⅲ.3.1 Analysis  
 
Ⅲ.3.1.1 Sub-section 3.1: Patent-specific measures 
 
Introduction: This sub-section investigates how a myriad of significant Chinese measures (hereafter 
“policies” and “measures” are used interchangeably) specifically mentioning IP (patents inclusive), 
most of which are also at least partially meant to stimulate patents, can sometimes discourage 
quality patents and innovation. As illustrated in the Introduction section, the Chinese government 
has promulgated a wide variety of patent-specific policies that likely effectively build patent quality 
in China; yet, there are also concerning components of a variety of other measures that likely do not 
result in similar outcomes. These measures are the subject of this section. 
 
Ⅲ.3.1.1.1 Financial and other incentives for patent development and/or with 
patent-related requirements 
 
Ⅲ.3.1.1.1.1 Subsidies specifically for patent filing 
 
For some time now, regional governments have been tasked with providing subsidies for entities 
filing IPR, the most common of which are subsidies for patent applications that cover official 
processing fees and even attorney fees. These subsidies have been extended to all types of patents: 
design, utility model, and invention patents. Many subsidies focus on domestic filings. Some 
subsidies focus on certain types of patent filings abroad, for example via the PCT.1  
 
The main problem with current patent filing subsidies is that they are largely awarded in a manner 
that not only wastes resources, but otherwise does not necessarily most effectively support the 
building of highest-quality patents and related innovation. Gao et al. (2011) notes that this 
deficiency is manifested in repeated patent applications, splitting inventions into smaller inventions 
just to boost the number of applications, filings for products that are already published or disclosed 
for a significant amount of time and are not patentable, filing an application to get an application 
number but not paying fees, and so on.2 This is an unnecessary waste of resources. In the same vein, 
it does not result in channelling resources effectively and efficiently to build the highest-quality 
patents and related innovation that China desires.    
 
While the government is commendably already taking steps to reform the patent subsidy system, it 
appears that notably more needs to be done. Policy statements like the NPDS 3 and 2012 National  
                                                        
1 See the Administrative Measures on Special Funds for Subsidising Foreign Patent Applications issued by MoF on April 14th 
2012. Among others, see the Provisional Measures on the Administration of Special Patent Funds for Subsidising Filing 
Patents Abroad, issued by MoF on September 15th 2009. Related provincial/municipal-level regulations, for example those 
focusing on invention patents include, among others, the 2012 Jinan Standards on Financial Support for Patents, effective 
March 6th 2012. 
2 Gao et al. (2011), pp 86-89 
3 For example, see Part IV, Section 4, para. 1 of the NPDS which calls policymakers to “Optimise patent subsidy policy and 
further define the orientation to enhance patent quality…” 
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IP Strategy4 have made the need for reforming the patent subsidy system apparent. Many Chinese 
government bodies reportedly now only pay subsidies when the patent is granted as opposed to at 
the application stage.5 Some provinces/municipalities, for example, Shanghai, are reforming their 
systems to only grant subsidies for invention patents.6 Nonetheless, it appears that a number of 
specific initiatives could be undertaken to more fully improve the subsidy system that do not appear 
to be currently discussed, at least publically. As such, these initiatives deserve to be considered by 
the authorities (see Recommendation 8 for further details). 
 
Ⅲ.3.1.1.1.2 IP ownership and restricted licensing provisions in currently effective 
indigenous innovation policies: an overview 
 
Background 
 
The concept of “indigenous innovation,” also sometimes translated as “independent innovation,” 
(whereas the Chinese equivalent of both terms is zìzhǔ chuàngxīn/自主创新), form the basis of what 
has become known as China’s “indigenous innovation policy” (IIP). Many observers now generally 
consider China’s IIP to also be the name for its innovation strategy at large. The S&T MLP, which has 
often been pointed to as establishing the main framework for the concept, defines “indigenous 
innovation” as “enhancing original innovation, integrated innovation, and re-innovation based on 
assimilation and absorption of imported technology, in order to improve our national innovation 
capability.”7 The plan further states that “…one should be clearly aware that importation of 
technology without emphasising assimilation, absorption, and re-innovation is bound to weaken the 
nation’s indigenous R&D capability, which in-turn widens the gap with world advanced levels.”8  
 
It is worth noting that although the S&T MLP does not explicitly emphasise “breakthrough” 
innovation by name, it is nonetheless clear from some subsequent policy statements that 
breakthrough innovation, and indigenous breakthrough innovation specifically, is one goal of China’s 
innovation strategy. For example, this goal is in part reflected in China’s recent focus on cutting-edge 
strategic industries, for example in China’s 12th Five-Year Plan and the SC Notice on IPR in Strategic 
Emerging Industries, and in other initiatives in other measures cited throughout this study. 
 
Several central and local-level implementing regulations from MoST, the National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC), Ministry of Finance (MoF) and their sub-central-level equivalents soon 
followed issuance of the S&T MLP, creating enacting IIP product catalogues, financing programs, and 
other IIP initiatives. The Trial Measures for the Administration of the Accreditation of National 
Indigenous Innovation Products (“2006 IIP Trial Measures”), issued on December 31st 2006 by MoST, 
NDRC, and MoF contain highly controversial requirements herein: specifically, requirements in 
Article 4.2 that products must be produced by a company with full ownership of the IPR on relevant 
products via its own activities or (by legal means) otherwise obtained ownership or usage rights for 
IP that is legally owned in China by a Chinese company, organisation, or citizen (and Article 4.3 that 
trademarks have to be owned by a Chinese company and originally registered in China, Article 4.4 
and 4.6 that contain certain requirements on certifications and quality of qualifying products, and 
                                                        
4 See Part 1, measure 5: “Improve the monitoring and settlement of abnormal patent applications, regulate local patent 
subsidy, promulgate in due time further opinions on regulating patent subsidy. (SIPO)”  
5 The patent quality challenge facing China and its businesses. (2011, January 20). IAM Magazine. http://www.iam-
magazine.com/issues/article.ashx?g=64724577-cf28-4cb1-bad6-c012264ee060 
6 2012, April 24- Consultations with Lin Xu, Vice Chair of IPR Working Group 
7 Part II, Section 1, para. 2 S&T MLP. Retrieved (in Chinese) from http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2006-02/09/content_183787.htm 
(one English translation available here: http://www.etiea.cn/data/attachment/123%286%29.pdf)  
8 Part II, Section 1, para. 3, S&T MLP 
Chapter 3: Dulling the Cutting Edge: How Patent-Related Policies and Practices Hamper Innovation in China 
 
77 
 
Article 4.7 that contains import substitution requirements).9 These provisions again appeared in the 
Measures on the Interpretation of National Indigenous Innovation Products, issued by MoST on 
February 26th 2007. 10  Several measures in 2006 and 2007, including provincial/municipal 
implementing measures, created controversy by linking indigenous innovation to government 
procurement preferences. 11  And once implementing measures for central-level government 
procurement product catalogues were issued in late 2009 and January 2010,12 foreign businesses 
actively banded together to complain against such IIPs.  
 
Recent reforms 
 
Commendably, the Chinese government has recently made firm policy statements that prior IIP 
policies will be delinked from government procurement preferences. As of July 1st 2011, the Chinese 
authorities agreed to nullify and void three regulations linking controversial IP requirements to 
preferential government procurement,13 and a formal notice was issued on July 4th 2011 nullifying 
the 2006 IIP Trial Measures.14 And on November 17th 2011, the State Council issued a notice stating: 
“Any mention of linkage between innovation policy and government procurement incentive measures 
within regulatory documents from all levels of local people's governments and related departments 
must without exception stop implementation from December 1st 2011.”15 While there are still some 
concerns over the actual implementation of these aforementioned measures, they are at least clear 
and indisputably positive in their own right. 
 
It is important to note that before the aforementioned delinking took place, a number of other 
policy statements changed the IIP framework, most notably the April 2010 Draft Notice Regarding 
                                                        
9 Concerns as raised in, among other sources, US-China Business Council [USCBC]. (2011, March). Issues brief: China’s 
domestic innovation and government procurement policies, pp 3-5. Retrieved from 
https://www.uschina.org/public/documents/2011/innovation_procurement_brief.pdf; Review of according articles in the 
Trial Measures for the Administration of the Accreditation of National Indigenous Innovation Products retrieved from 
http://big5.mofcom.gov.cn/gate/big5/im.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/subject/zsjm/localcc/201012/20101207305384.html. 
Note 1: depending on the secondary source reviewed, some or all of these issues may be listed as concerns, for example, 
USCBC (March 2011), Appendix 6, provides a detailed list of indigenous innovation requirements that explicitly require 
import substitution as part of indigenous innovation development.  
10 Para. 5 of the Measures on the Interpretation of National Independent Innovation Products retrieved from 
http://www.most.gov.cn/ztzl/cxqygzhy/cxqyhydt/200702/t20070226_41506.htm  
11 See Article 23 of the S&T MLP; Article 13, 14 and 24 of the 2007 Evaluation Measures on Indigenous Innovation Products 
for Government Procurement; among other measures listed on p. 8-9 and Appendix 6 of USBC  (March 2011) . Note: Many 
of the sub-central level indigenous innovation accreditation/management measures listed in Appendix 6 of USCBC (March 
2011) require IPR ownership requirements as distinct from licensing, or require exclusive licensing of IPR fully owned by a 
China-based entity. 
12 In November 2009, MoST, NDRC, and MOF released two circulars, one on application procedures and a notice describing 
provincial duties for the proposed central-level indigenous innovation catalogue. On December 29th 2009, a catalogue of 
industrial equipment products was released containing stipulations for accrediting national indigenous innovation products. 
On January 11th 2010, the Regulations of Government Procurement Law nationally set-forth preferential government 
procurement for indigenous innovation products. A variety of other controversial IIP rules were passed at the same time 
that did not only focus on government procurement preferences, for example, see Accreditation Rules for National 
Indigenous Innovation Products, November  2009, among other regulations as detailed in USBC (March 2011), p. 19. 
13 Lubman, S. (2011, July 22). Changes to China’s ‘indigenous innovation’ policy: Don’t get too excited. Wall Street Journal. 
China Realtime Report. Retrieved from http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2011/07/22/changes-to-chinas-indigenous-
innovation-policy-dont-get-too-excited/ 
14 Notice on Voiding “Trial Measures for the Administration of the Accreditation of National Indigenous Products (2006)” 
issued on July 4th 2011 by MOST, NDRC and MOF. Retrieved from 
http://www.jskw.gov.cn/FileUpload/%E5%85%B3%E4%BA%8E%E5%81%9C%E6%AD%A2%E6%89%A7%E8%A1%8C%E3%80
%8A%E5%9B%BD%E5%AE%B6%E8%87%AA%E4%B8%BB%E5%88%9B%E6%96%B0%E4%BA%A7%E5%93%81%E8%AE%A4%
E5%AE%9A%E7%AE%A1%E7%90%86%E5%8A%9E%E6%B3%95%EF%BC%88%E8%AF%95%E8%A1%8C%EF%BC%89%E3%80
%8B%E7%9A%84%E9%80%9A%E7%9F%A5.pdf  
15 A State Council Notice Directing All Government Entities To Remove Any Mention of Linkages Between Indigenous 
Innovation Policy and Government Procurement Within Regulatory Documents, which the Chongqing Legislative Affairs 
Office published on their own website: http://www.cqfzb.gov.cn/Pro_General/ContentShow.aspx?ProID=49&myid=8655  
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the Launch of the National Indigenous Innovation Product Accreditation Work for 2010 (hereafter the 
“April 2010 Draft Notice”). Article 2.2 of the April 2010 Draft Notice relaxed the provision on IPR 
ownership to allow indigenous innovation accreditation on IP licensed for use in China without 
specifying where the entity that owns the original IP (and is doing the licensing) must be located; 
Article 2.3 stipulated that trademarks no longer have to be originally registered in China (but must at 
least have the right to use the trademark in China); and Article 2.4 set new technology quality 
requirements (e.g. to be proven effective in conserving energy, or “substantially” improve on an 
original product’s quality, performance, structure, material, or craftsmanship to be eligible for such 
accreditation).16  
 
These policies were ostensibly changed due to pressure from foreign governments and industry 
associations.17 These organisations, including the European Chamber, argued on behalf of companies 
saying they would prefer to license technology, particularly their most important and 
innovative/higher-end technologies, instead of transferring it via full-on ownership transfer 
agreements (or even exclusive licensing), and in many cases this technology would need to be 
licensed from abroad (as it is owned by parent companies registered abroad). Thus it was argued the 
previous IIP policies would push companies to intentionally pursue less-IP-intensive operations in 
China.  
 
Existing concerns 
 
Despite some positive changes, significant concerns surround the April 2010 Draft Notice in 
particular. Most importantly, outside a number of concerns over specific provisions in the notice,18 it 
does not appear a final version of the April 2010 Draft Notice was ever even finalised, despite a call 
for comments deadline on the measure, and thus the measure remains unbinding.19 And no other 
measures appear to have subsequently taken the notice’s place in making allowances for IP licensing 
from abroad as a core part of China’s IIP system. As such, it appears China’s IIP framework is not 
legally bound to only instituting the type of IP requirements that were present in the April 2010 
Draft Notice. In fact, the type of controversial IP requirements the April 2010 Draft Notice was 
supposed to amend appear to be presently embodied in the term “indigenous intellectual property 
rights,” which is defined in Box 5 below.  
 
                                                        
16 Other criteria also apply. See the April 2010 Draft Notice, issued on April 9th 2010 for public comments (till May 10th 
2010), by MoST, NDRC and MoF, retrieved from http://www.most.gov.cn/tztg/201004/t20100409_76710.htm  
17 Ernst (2011) (p. 4 suggests that lobbying by foreign business associations “possibly” created these changes) 
18  Linton et al. (2010) notes that some have worriedly interpreted this measure to mean that indigenous innovation 
products must be locally researched and developed (including requiring licensing of IP usage rights in China), and the R&D 
should be led by a Chinese entity. This could exclude wholly foreign-owned enterprises (WFOEs), JVs where the foreign 
party has a majority holding, and perhaps Chinese entities with R&D centres abroad. Also there is concern over the 
requirement to comply with unspecified “national industrial and technology policies” (Article 2.1); as well as concern about 
the requirement that the IPR involved cannot be subject to dispute (Article 2.2.), whereas without further clarity this may 
include unsubstantiated allegations raised by a third party (Source: Linton, K. et al. (2010). China: Intellectual property 
infringement, indigenous innovation policies, and frameworks for measuring the effects on the U.S. economy. US 
International Trade Commission [USITC]. Investigation No. 332-514. p. 5-11. Retrieved from 
http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4199.pdf) 
19 USTR (2011) confirms that the draft measure has not been finalised to date, although notes that the Chinese authorities 
“have not requested or accepted applications for accreditation.” (Source: USTR. (2011). 2011 National trade estimate 
report on foreign trade barriers: China. United States Trade Representative. p. 88. Retrieved from 
http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/2694) 
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Box 5: Note on usage of the term “indigenous intellectual property rights” 
 
The term “indigenous intellectual property rights,” which one might also translate as “independent 
intellectual property rights” (whereas the Chinese equivalent for both is: zìzhǔ zhīshì chǎnquán/自主
知识产权) is frequently found in a number of measures reviewed in this study. Consultations suggest 
that the term originated in the mid-1990s in policy advice to build domestic IPR in the Chinese 
automobile industry.20 At the turn of the new millennium, the term was used in important policy 
guidance, which is still in effect, from state leader Jiang Zemin at an April 2nd 2000 conference on the 
Exhibition on China's Fifteen-Year Achievements in Patent Work. 21  
 
There is solid evidence (see below) that the term typically means IP ownership, including acquired 
ownership, by a Chinese entity, which in some cases expressly is said to exclude entities with a 
majority foreign ownership. While not the norm, the term is defined somewhat differently in the 
HNTE tax scheme (see below section for details); and in some cases, includes an option for restricted 
licensing of IP fully owned by a Chinese entity.22 These concepts of “indigenous intellectual property 
rights” are collectively hereafter referred to in this study as “IND IP” conditions. 
 
Some key sources defining “indigenous intellectual property rights” 
 
Official government measures and policy advice 
 
 The below listed measures are just a few examples of clear government policy advice that 
indigenous intellectual property rights mean IPR owned by a Chinese entity: 
 
 Guidance for Enlarging Exports with Indigenous Intellectual Property Rights issued on May 
11th 2004 by the Anhui MOFCOM sets forth guidance, which appears to still be in effect, on 
indigenous intellectual property rights: 
Part 2: “The definition of indigenous intellectual property rights is invented in China; there is 
no corresponding concept in the international arena. Administrations such as Ministry of 
Science and Technology and the IPR Bureau have not provided clear definitions of indigenous 
intellectual property rights. In this document, indigenous intellectual property rights refer to 
IPR legally owned, invented or designed by Chinese citizens; or Chinese legal persons or other 
organisations without legal personality (referring to those entities whose original capital 
formation is not majority foreign held). It also includes those IPR bought from other Chinese 
citizens, legal persons, or other organisations without legal personality.”23 
 
 Notice on What is a Product With Independent Intellectual Property Rights?, issued on July 
3rd 2007 by the Tianjin Intellectual Property Office, which appears to still be in effect, defines 
indigenous intellectual property rights as: 
“...In China, the term ‘Indigenous Intellectual Property Rights’ refers to independent technical 
knowledge assets lawfully owned by Chinese citizens, legal persons, or organisations without 
legal personality, or leading research or creative design conducted by those entities, or the 
patents or copyrights purchased from other Chinese citizens, legal persons or other 
organisations without legal personality.  
                                                        
20 2012, August 2 - Consultations with a member of the European Chamber in Shanghai 
21 “We must energetically promote the long-term development of our economy by supporting the nation's patent 
undertaking, enhancing the role of the patent system and furthering growth of high-tech products with self-owned 
independent intellectual property rights and market prospects.”(Source: Jiang, Z. China’s Intellectual Property Rights 
Protection in 2000. Retrieved from http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=dbref&id=94) 
22 The definitions used in the April 2010 Draft Notice (which again, does not look like it was even ever in-force) are herein 
not considered to constitute IND IP requirements. 
23 Retrieved on August 1, 2012 from http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/difang/anhui/200508/20050800293317.html. 
Note: Translation from the European Chamber thus is unofficial. 
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1. The term ‘Chinese legal persons or organisation without legal personality’ means those 
entities whose original capital composition is not dominated by foreign capital.  
2. The term ‘leading research or creative design’ includes the research or designs conducted 
through self-innovation or through those cooperation projects that are led by the party 
who declares the ownership of the research or design result.  
3. The term ‘intellectual property rights’ includes invention patents, design of new 
technological products, proprietary technology possessing scientific and technological 
achievements, computer chips (include database, multimedia and internet products), 
layout-design of IC chips, new animal and plant species, and protection of traditional 
Chinese medicine.”24 
 
 Several Indigenous Innovation Accreditation/Management Measures define indigenous 
intellectual property rights. For example, the Hebei Province Indigenous Innovation Product 
Accreditation Management Rules (Provisional) (2007), jointly issued by the provincial MoST, 
NDRC, and MoF on September 28th 2007 (hereafter the “Hebei IIP Rules”), which appears to 
still be in effect (see below for further explanation on this point) defines indigenous 
innovation products as those meeting the following conditions: 
 Article 6: “Indigenous innovation products applying for accreditation should meet the 
following basic conditions…” 
Article 6.2: “Products have obtained indigenous IP rights and have indigenous brands. 
Products that have obtained indigenous intellectual property rights are defined as those 
where the applying unit owns IP products through its own innovative activities, or gain 
ownership of IP rights that were acquired by the applying unit through assignment by 
Chinese enterprises, institutions, or citizens who own such IP rights. Products with indigenous 
brands are those where the applying unit owns the right to the registered trademark of the 
product.”25 
 
 Several Indigenous Innovation Product Accreditation/Management Measures include in their 
definition of “indigenous IPR” an option for restricted licensing of IP fully owned by a 
Chinese entity in addition to the option of ownership of the IPR.26  
 
 The definition of indigenous IPR including ownership of IPR registered in China or the option 
of “an exclusive worldwide license for five years or more” appear to be particular to several 
measures underpinning the HNTE tax scheme. These measures are discussed further in 
section below on that scheme.  
 
For context, a number of government measures using the term “indigenous intellectual property 
rights” conspicuously do not define the term. As noted in the Guidance for Enlarging Exports with 
Indigenous Intellectual Property Rights, the term as used in China is unique to China27 and in fact the 
central level, for reasons one could speculate about, does not appear to have promulgated an official 
definition of the term mandated to apply across all ministries and levels of government.28  
                                                        
24 Retrieved on August 2, 2012 from http://www.tjipo.gov.cn/fwz/zspj/zscq/200903/t20090324_14802.html. Note: 
Translation from the European Chamber thus is unofficial. 
25 Retrieved on August 11, 2012 from http://www.zjkfgw.gov.cn/Project/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=537. Translation is 
from the European Chamber thus is unofficial. Note: The Hebei Province Department of Finance Measure on Stopping the 
Implementation of the Independent Innovation Products by Government Procurement Preferences, issued by the Hebei 
Province Department of Finance on July 12, 2011, nullifies Hebei’s government procurement preferences as linked to 
indigenous innovation products accreditation (measure retrieved on August 11, 2012 from 
http://www.hebgp.gov.cn/upnews/upfiles/zfcg_zcfg/TS_LX20111222162415jg@ng.htm) 
26 See Appendix 6 of USCBC (2011) for a helpful listing of these measures. 
27 A variety of sources, including WIPO, use the term “indigenous intellectual property rights,” but this refers to rights on, 
for example, cultural works produced by indigenous (i.e. a particular ethnic group of) peoples. 
28 As such, while it appears that the aforementioned definitions are those used when interpreting the term, to be 
completely sure of exactly how the term is applied in practice across all Chinese measures mentioning the term deserves 
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Other sources 
 
Key Chinese policy studies and Chinese legal commentaries define indigenous IPR. SIPO & PKU 
(2005), a policy study commissioned by SIPO to Beijing University, finds that “Indigenous intellectual 
property rights refer to the intellectual property legally owned by Chinese citizens, legal persons, or 
other organisations through their leading research or creative design.”29 Zhonggu Law Online (2011), 
among others, notes there is a clear distinction between “indigenous” IPR and “dependent” IPR, 
finding that indigenous IPR is that owned by domestic entity in China on an invention whose R&D 
and production was completed in China; and further notes that dependent IPR refers to all IPR, 
including that jointly held by a foreign and Chinese entity “…belong to an entity abroad, or mainly 
belong to the foreign side.”30  
 
Additionally, consultations with two Chinese lawyers and an ex-government official based in China 
provide some useful insights into the term. The consultations confirm the term in practice is meant 
to refer to IPR on core technology owned by a Chinese entity that in no way is reliant on a foreign 
entity/influence. The consultations also suggest that the term is widely used in a variety of 
secondary sources and government interpretations as fitting this same definition; and that domestic 
Chinese companies that those consulted have talked with also interpret the concept in this same 
way. Additionally, one of those consulted said that while there might conceivably be a few examples 
of instances where the government has allowed IPR from an entity with majority foreign ownership 
to constitute indigenous IPR, this will only be to create the veneer of non-discrimination, while most 
all application of the term intentionally excludes even China-based entities with majority foreign 
ownership. 31 
 
Different types of IIPs with IND IP requirements 
 
Sub-central level Indigenous Innovation Product Accreditation/Management Measures  
 
While many of the provincial/municipal Indigenous Innovation Product Accreditation/Management 
Measures that were promulgated in 2006 and 2007 have since clearly been invalidated, other 
measures, or to be more precise – the provisions of several measures that are not directly related to 
government procurement preferences – do not appear to be invalidated through a publically 
available notice(s). Indeed, some measures were fully invalidated at some point in 2011. However, 
other measures do not appear to be officially invalidated, as while they are flanked by measures that 
specifically invalidate the government procurement preferences linked to indigenous innovation 
                                                                                                                                                                            
clarification with all Chinese authorities that use the term. This should be considered when reviewing the measures 
mentioning indigenous intellectual property rights analysed in this study. 
29 SIPO and Peking University Intellectual Property Institute. (2005, October 31). Study on Major IPR Cases with External 
Dimensions since China joined the WTO, p.11. Retrieved on August 12, 2012 from 
http://stlaw.pku.edu.cn/UploadFiles/200941714515938.doc  
30 “…independent intellectual property rights in China mean that it [the protected invention] is researched, developed, run, 
and produced by Chinese citizen or Chinese corporation/organisation independently and eventually enjoys the ownership of 
the intellectual property….Non-independent intellectual property rights mean that it [the protected invention] is researched, 
developed, run and produced by natural persons, corporations or other organisations from abroad, and who enjoy the 
ownership of the intellectual property rights. The main legal bodies holding non-independent IPR can consist of one foreign 
enterprise, or a combination of a Chinese enterprise and foreign corporations, whereas the eventual proprietary rights 
belong to an entity abroad, or mainly belong to the foreign side.” (Source: Zhonggu Law Online (2011). The contrasting 
relationship between independent intellectual property rights and non-independent intellectual property rights. Retrieved 
on August 14, 2012 from http://news.9ask.cn/zclaw/zczs/smzc/201105/1210223.shtml) 
31 Consultations with three individuals, one based in Beijing and the other two based in Shanghai, on August 2nd, August 8th, 
and August 11th 2012 respectively. 
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product accreditation, they do not invalidate the entire institution of the indigenous product 
accreditation/management system as set up in the original measures.32  
 
For those provincial/municipal Indigenous Innovation Product Accreditation/Management Measures 
that appear to be still valid, it is particularly concerning that some contain IPR ownership 
requirements (as distinct from licensing of IPR owned by a Chinese entity, let alone licensing of IPR 
owned abroad). By way of one example, the Hebei IIP Rules, mentioned above in Box 5, sets forth 
clear preconditions for ownership of IP rights.  Although the rules are flanked by a measure that 
invalidates government procurement preferences linked to indigenous innovation product 
accreditation, the rules do not appear invalidated in their entirety by any readily available 
invalidation notice. The indigenous product accreditation/management system established by the 
rules also does not appear invalidated. 
 
While the existence of these types of measures are not per se concerning given they are delinked 
from government procurement preferences, it is reasonable to seek assurances that they are not 
currently being linked to financial incentives outside government procurement preferences, and that 
they will not be linked to any financial incentives in the future. In fact, these concerns are made even 
more real given evidence presented in below sections within this Chapter that 
provinces/municipalities are already linking IND IP requirements to certain financial incentives. 
Generally, IND-IP-based IIPs warrant a number of concerns, the most significant of which are 
discussed in-depth below. Even at a very minimum, if Indigenous Innovation Product 
Accreditation/Management Measures have been invalidated through a non-publicly disclosed notice, 
it is disconcerting they are still published online with no such notification. 
 
In addition to the abovementioned measures, it is worth noting that several provinces in China have 
Indigenous Innovation Product Accreditation/Management Measures including INDP requirements 
linked to government procurement preferences for which no invalidation notice, for the government 
procurement preferences specifically or otherwise, appear to be publically available. These include, 
for example, measures from Qinghai and Sichuan.33 
 
                                                        
32 As a general point worth highlighting in this section, given the sustainability of certain government procurement-related 
policies is scrutinised, requirements in government procurement policies that may be controversial in some respects 
require objective analysis to determine if they in fact might sustainably contribute to innovation and an economy’s 
development at large. (For example, although not directly tantamount to IND IP requirements, an investigation herein may 
look into a sometimes controversial tool used to build technology capacity that is linked with government procurement 
preferences: “offsets.” Offsets, which can include technology licensing requirements, are sometimes proposed to build 
innovation, and an analysis on these as tools to build innovation should be based on questions like those posed in Bleser, 
Prud’homme et al. (2011) Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment (SIA) on the Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA) between the EU and Canada: Final Report. European Commission Trade Assessments, pp 289-290, and 
pp 304-306. http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/september/tradoc_148201.pdf. If crafted properly, government 
procurement policies can be used to build industries in ways that can contribute to economic, social, and environmental 
progress.) 
33 Qinghai Province Indigenous Innovation Product Accreditation Management Rules issued on May 27th 2010 by Qinghai 
Province Department of Science and Technology (retrieved on August 17, 2012 from 
http://www.qhppc.com/html/zhengcefagui/20100527/409.html); and Sichuan Province’s Indigenous Innovation Product 
Accreditation Implementing Management Rules (Provisional) issued in 2009 by Sichuan Province Department of Science 
and Technology, Sichuan Province Development and Reform Commission, Sichuan Province Economy Commission, and 
Sichuan Province Department of Finance (retrieved on August 17, 2012 from 
http://jscx.scst.gov.cn/NewsContent.aspx?current=%E6%94%BF%E7%AD%96%E6%96%87%E4%BB%B6&NewsID=240) 
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Also, while not necessarily as concerning as the central-level and provincial/municipal measures 
given they may involve comparatively lower value contracts,34 it is at least worth noting there are 
Chinese city-level management/accreditation guidelines for indigenous innovation products that 
currently do not appear to be officially invalided nor are flanked by measures invalidating 
government procurement preference components of the measures. One example is the Qingdao City 
Indigenous Innovation Product Accreditation Management Rules (Provisional), issued by the Qingdao 
Science and Technology Bureau on August 1st 2008, stated to be in effect till December 31st 2012 and for 
which no readily available invalidation notice appears available. The measures set forth clear IND IP 
requirements linked with government procurement preferences.35  
 
Other measures 
 
In addition to the provincial/municipal IIP accreditation catalogues that do not appear to be 
publically invalidated, this study presents a number of Chinese measures that, in some instances in 
addition to other concerns mentioned in those sections, clearly make support in the form of 
subsidies and other financial assistance contingent on IND-IP-based requirements. A non-exhaustive 
list of examples of these measures includes:  
 
 Sub-central level plans from 2011 that precondition subsidies from S&T and invention-
focused funds on enterprises meeting IND IP requirements (see Section “Ⅲ.3.1.1.1.4 Sub-
central level incentives for IP development” for more details).  
 Several measures mentioned in Section “Ⅲ.3.1.1.1.3 CFTDF and similar subsidies” that 
stipulate IND-IP-based requirements as an exclusive precondition for qualifying for subsidies 
from a foreign trade fund that, according to even old data, as a whole is worth over RMB 37 
billion.  
 Measures mentioned in Section “Ⅲ.3.1.1.2 Standardisation policies” that stipulate IND IP 
requirements and building of certain standards as a precondition from receiving grants up to 
1 million RMB.  
 Measures mentioned in Section “Ⅲ.3.1.1.1.6 HNTE status” underpinning the HNTE tax 
scheme.  
 While not yet explicitly linked to IPR ownership requirements, there are a wide range of 
recent Chinese policies that promote the future (e.g. by 2015) development of IPR 
ownership, inclusive of patent ownership, by China-based entities in a way that is worth 
seeking assurances that these policies will not be implemented via IND-IP-based measures. 
The “Chapter 3” section (as well as the “Chapter 2” section) in the Annex provides an 
overview of some of these policies. 
 
                                                        
34 Note: City-level procurement is often of comparatively lower monetary value (this said, in China, these amounts are still 
quite sizeable given the size of its cities), and it is not unusual for it to be excluded from the commitments of parties to the 
WTO’s Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) (to which China has not even yet acceded). 
35 Part 4: “Accredited Indigenous Innovation Products will be listed and published in Qingdao City Indigenous Innovation 
Product Catalogue… When the municipal government organs, institutions and group organisations use fiscal fund for 
government procurement they should therein prioritise products that are included in the Qingdao City Government 
Procurement Indigenous Innovation Product Catalogue….” 
Part 6: “To qualify as an accredited indigenous innovation product, a product needs to meet the following requirements:” 
Part 6, Article 2: “Products possess independent intellectual property rights, and have a clear equity situation. That is to say, 
through dominant technological innovative activities, applicant units own intellectual property rights in China by law; or 
through legal transfer or permit, Chinese enterprises, institutions or citizens obtain the ownership or the right of use for 
intellectual property rights in China by law.” (Measure retrieved on August 15, 2012 from 
http://china.trade2cn.com/news/NX70ltD355S0sv0-1.html). Translation is from the European Chamber thus is unofficial. 
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Assessing the contribution of IND-IP-based IIPs to innovation and patent quality  
 
It is important to assess if rewarding enterprises according to IND-IP-based criteria as listed in the 
aforementioned IIPs is a useful incentive to build patent quality and innovation. (While all such 
references do not necessarily mention “patents” specifically, given the context of the measures, it is 
clear that the provisions are intended to encompass patented products.) From one vantage point, 
the aforementioned IND-IP-based IIP schemes indeed seem to help to build domestic enterprises: 
indeed self-owned brands and self-owned patents (or other forms of IP) collectively can be a metric 
of the innovation capacity and competitiveness of an entity. However, this viewpoint deserves 
further analysis, particularly in terms of what factors determine transfer of IPR ownership vs. IP 
licensing in China, and if China’s preoccupation with IND-IP-based IIPs, at least the type that appear 
to be currently conceived, is the best way to stimulate innovation and related quality patents. These 
issues are briefly discussed in Box 6 and Box 7 below, and the text following those boxes. 
 
Box 6: Why might China be preoccupied with IND-IP-based IIPs? 
 
Why the preoccupation with IND-IP-based policies? 
 
It is quite clear from its IND-IP-based IIPs that China wants to build-up Chinese entities’ ownership of 
IPR, and that policymakers believe IND IP IIPs a useful way to do so. Within this drive to build up 
ownership of IPR, Chinese policymakers inferably view IND IP IIPs as important for a number of more 
specific, sometimes inter-related reasons. Among potentially other rationales, such policies might be 
argued by the government to create exogenous incentives for Chinese entities to:  
 Build indigenous innovation strength which in turn strengthens the perception of China as 
an innovator, which creates spillovers in terms of building reputation abroad which can 
translate into various economic gains; 
 Build  indigenous innovation strength which in turn stimulates nationalism at home which 
further stimulates domestic innovation; and 
 Contribute to China’s national economic security by ensuring a strong foundation of 
domestically-owned patents. 
 
The policies might also be argued by the government to supplement the incentives endogenous to 
building IP ownership experienced by Chinese entities, namely the ability to: 
 Enjoy protection on inventions which encourages further investment in R&D and other 
inputs of innovation to create other inventions in China;  
 Enjoy higher royalties that must be paid when the technology is licensed and/or otherwise 
strengthen bargaining with competitors; 
 Avoid paying the aforementioned royalties to another (e.g. foreign) entity;  
 Use litigation grounded on an owned patent to  drain competitors’ resources and thus put 
them at a competitive disadvantage;  
 Deter litigation by threatening to countersue with an owned patent; and 
 Block competitors’ development in a certain field by monopolising patent ownership in that 
field.  
 
Are these solid policy arguments for why IND-IP-based IIPs as currently conceived will best create 
quality patents and related innovation? 
 
The general idea that IND-IP-based IIPs may optimally encourage patent quality and related 
innovation, particularly breakthrough innovation, in China is questioned in the text following this 
box. In short, to the extent IND IP requirements are linked to discriminatory practices, for example 
subsidies, as mentioned in subsequent sections in this Chapter, they may hamper the end goal of 
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building patent quality and related innovation.  
 
In addition to this analysis, some of the more specific abovementioned reasons for IND-IP-based-
based IIPs in China deserve scrutiny. For example, it should at least be noted that IP royalties are not 
necessarily always a very significant part of profit for certain companies, although are certainly 
important in some cases.36 It is also apparent that Chinese entities’ overuse of patents as “weapons” 
in litigation has caused waste of public resources and hampers innovation and building of quality 
patent in China (these issues are further discussed in Chapter 4 hereto).  
 
 
Four reasons why China’s IND-IP-based IIPs as currently conceived may not stimulate breakthrough 
innovation and patent quality as well as envisaged by policymakers: 
 
This section must be premised by again saying, as mentioned above, that a desire to boost 
indigenous intellectual property rights and indigenous Chinese innovation is by no means a negative 
policy objective, and in fact in principle goes hand-in-hand with the larger objective of boosting 
innovation and patent quality in China; however, the devil is in the details in terms of the exact types 
of efforts undertaken to achieve this goal. As such, it is important to critically assess if China’s IND-IP-
based IIPs as currently conceived will actually best stimulate innovation, particularly breakthrough 
innovation, and related patent quality. Although there is an absence of detailed studies empirically 
assessing these dynamics, and some ambiguity in the exact legal requirements of some IND IP IIPs,37 
this study posits a number of potential problems with China’s current IND-IP-based IIPs showing they 
very well might not stimulate breakthrough innovation and associated patent quality as well as 
perhaps envisaged by policymakers. 
 
First, overemphasis of what could be termed ‘IND IP thought’ in Chinese IIP can indoctrinate the 
policymaking system in a way that prevents creation and implementation of other domestic Chinese 
innovation polices that could be more helpful for building-up quality patent filings and related 
innovation. The preoccupation with IND IP can overly indoctrinate the policy formulation process, in 
effect steering policy in only one direction (the IND IP-related direction). This would not necessarily 
be a problem in the IND IP criteria plus financial incentives formula was a rigorously proven (e.g. via 
empirical economic analysis) approach towards optimally stimulating innovation; however, it does 
                                                        
36 Note: For example, in 2010 royalty revenue as a share of total revenue for Philips was only 1.86%, for Ericsson was only 
2.26%, and for Astra Zeneca was only 1.61%. That said, there are other firms where royalty revenues make up a 
significantly higher share of their total revenue, and it is likely that such royalties would be very important for SMEs. 
(Source: WIPO [2011], p. 64) 
37 Of note, it is not fully clear on paper to what extent Chinese entities need to own all IPR (or be licensed IPR from Chinese 
entities owning such IPR) on specified products to qualify under many of the indigenous innovation product accreditation 
programs that were reviewed. There does not appear to be clear requirements across all measures on the exact extent of 
ownership (or licensing) of products required, for example all the measures do not clearly require ownership for 100% of 
all IP relevant to specified products. Although certain measures reviewed say “ownership and interest shall be clear and 
‘stable’” and “a product can have more than one invention patents, utility patents, software copyrights and innovated 
brands,” it is not fully clear, on paper at least, about the handling of an instance where one product is indeed associated 
with more than one related patent with different ownership structures. In the absence of such requirements, a Chinese 
entity could theoretically qualify under the IIPs as having “indigenously innovated” products if they only own (or are 
licensed) one (or a few) patents from Chinese entities (perhaps of dubious value) on specified products, whereas there are 
other patents on that product owned or licensed by entities based abroad. And further, therein the company’s real 
competitive advantage (even in terms of the product in question) could in fact be derived from other factors.  
 
However, all of this said, drawing from the more specific definitions of “indigenous intellectual property rights” in other 
measures outside the product accreditation IIPs reviewed, and upon review of secondary sources and consultations with 
experts in China, it seems likely that in practice an entity with an ideal “indigenous innovation product” would meet typical 
IND IP requirements, i.e. the entity would be Chinese (without foreign majority ownership) and have 100% ownership of all 
IPR associated with that product.   
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not appear to be. Thus, if alternative views were better heeded and different, more proven, policies 
crafted and implemented, at least in addition to these IND-IP-based policies, this could very well 
more optimally stimulate domestic innovation and patent quality in China. Allowing licensed IP from 
entities abroad would in itself be a more positive policy approach than the IND IP approach, the 
same, well-recognised conclusion manifested in the April 2010 Draft Notice. Other alternative 
approaches could be considered, for example, criteria for substantial and productive investments in 
R&D (which do not appear to be criteria in many of the IND-IP-based IIPs measures reviewed38). 
 
The comparative power of certain personalities in ministries making innovation policy, e.g. MoST 
above MOFCOM, might exacerbate genuine collegial creation of the best innovation policies herein, 
whereas a more collegial approach is likely ideal given the multi-faceted nature of innovation 
policymaking which requires expertise in S&T issues, patents, investment, tax, among other areas. 
And even herein, on one hand although there is indeed evidence of an ostensible dialogue between 
the ministries, on the other hand the policies produced therein may still reference potentially 
disconcerting IIPs. For example, albeit not explicit, there is a potentially concerning link between 
financial incentives and “IP rights obtained from indigenous innovation activities” in the latest 2012 
National IP Strategy.39  
 
Second, given decision-making of foreign enterprises, it seems unlikely that IND-IP-based policies will 
effectively push (or pull) competitive foreign firms at large to increasingly transfer ownership of IP to 
Chinese entities, particularly quality IP, and in fact may encourage them not to transfer ownership of 
IP or even license IP (exclusively or otherwise) to Chinese entities. While the obvious objective of 
such IND-IP-based policies is to build indigenous innovation capacity as distinct from that built upon 
foreign innovation, it seems highly unlikely that the policies intend to discourage foreign companies 
from transferring much needed know-how to and developing much needed know-how in the 
Chinese market. To be sure, it is well-recognised by the Chinese government, as reflected in a wide 
variety of policy statements mentioned throughout this study, that foreign know-how, if utilised 
properly, is one crucial building block for innovation in China.  
 
IND-IP-based policies will likely not stimulate further foreign ownership or licensing transfers of 
quality IP to Chinese entities because, despite the occasional anecdotal examples to the contrary, 
empirical evidence over the last 20 years presented in Chapter 1 suggests that foreign enterprises at 
large avoid transferring breakthrough technology via licensing let alone transferring ownership to 
China or otherwise developing world-class technology in China. (For context, a variety of studies 
note that multinational companies use different methods of technology transfer, which may include 
licensing and ownership transfer, depending on the level of IPR protection in a host country.40) This 
                                                        
38 There are exceptions. For example, requirements in the Indigenous Innovation Product Accreditation Management Rules 
of Dalian, in Liaoning Province, issued on Dec. 2008, Dazhengban Fa [2008] No.203 by Dalian Municipality, in Article 2 (2) 
find: “The proportion of funding input for high-technology and products R&D in the enterprise last year should account for 
more than 5% of annual sales revenue.” Of note, Hebei, in its annex, generally states that enterprises which are recognised 
as the manufacturer of independent innovation products should report their R&D funding each October. 
39 While they do not explicitly reference IP “ownership,” the focus on “IP rights obtained” as linked to indigenous 
innovation activities in  S&T projects is mentioned in Part 1, measure 1 and 2 of the latest 2012 National IP Strategy, to 
which 28 government bodies contributed, and should at least be monitored. Part 1, measure 1: MoST: “Revise the 
Assessment Index System of National Technology Invention Awards, enhance the assessment on patent quality, increase the 
rewards to significant technological inventions and IP rights obtained through indigenous innovation activities.” Part 1, 
measure 2: MIIT: “…give priority and assistance to projects which obtained IP rights through indigenous innovation 
activities, specify the acceleration of indigenous innovation capacity building…” (emphasis added) 
40 Maskus (2000) notes there are three ways to transfer technology across international borders: trade through goods; 
foreign direct investment (FDI) within enterprises (multinationals, in particular); and contractual licensing of technology 
among unaffiliated firms, subsidiaries and/or joint ventures. The same study finds that FDI, often a main method of patent 
ownership transfer, rises only when patent rights are strengthened to levels with which enterprises are comfortable, 
otherwise licensing agreements are preferred. (Source: Maskus, K. E. (2000). Intellectual property rights and economic 
development. Paper for “Beyond the Treaties: A Symposium on Compliance with International Intellectual Property Law” at 
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is due to fears over China’s IPR protection environment and given these firms' market power. 
Consultations within the European Chamber find that this generally represents decision-making of 
some of the biggest and most competitive multinationals, most of who have been operating in China 
for decades.41 The aforementioned IND-IP-based IIPs do nothing to alleviate the fear about the 
quality of the IPR environment in China, and given their discriminatory nature in fact worsen foreign 
enterprises’ perception of the friendlessness of the innovation environment at large in China. And 
this likely holds even with the economic downturns in the rest of the world and the comparative 
attractiveness of the Chinese market acting as a pull factor. 
 
To be sure, this trend will also apply to foreign SMEs as well as multinationals. INSME (2011) notes 
that to-date European firms most commonly transfer their technology to Chinese firms via licensing 
agreements as opposed to transferring ownership, adding that many of these technology transfers 
are not even in the areas of high-technology but in low technology, or consumer or industrial 
products.42 And even for new SMEs with highest-quality patents looking to take advantage of 
opportunities in the Chinese market, there is a strong reluctance, given IPR enforcement concerns 
among other issues, to establishing any operations in China, let alone transfer ownership of 
technology to Chinese entities.43 The aforementioned INP IP IIPs do nothing to improve foreign 
SMEs’ perception of the IPR enforcement environment in China, and in fact worsen their perception 
on the innovation environment at large in China.  
 
As a note, this trend is further reinforced by the fact that even if “worldwide rights to exclusive use” 
is allowed in some measures as an option in meeting IIP IPR requirements, this option cannot be 
practically met, as current Chinese law effectively prohibits an owner/licensor from retaining IP 
usage rights in a foreign jurisdiction, and also prohibits any other person, including a subsidiary of a 
foreign enterprise from receiving a sublicense from the China licensee.44 This further undermines the 
ability of IIP IPR requirements to spur patent quality and related innovation. (For more on this 
specific point see the later section in this Chapter on the HNTE scheme.) 
 
Third, and in a related vein to the second point, China’s IND-IP-based IIPs may even have some push 
effect of encouraging some companies to develop certain initiatives in alternative regions where 
they can contribute to quality patents and local innovation. Innovation investments by companies in 
EU Member States in particular may be increasingly pushed away from China towards India, the US 
and Canada, Eastern Europe, Japan, other EU Member States, among other places. Obviously this 
decision-making is based on a wide range of pull factors, but when also compounded with the push 
factors mentioned in the Introduction to this study and other places throughout (e.g. IPR 
enforcement concerns, lack of access to credit, shortage of talent in certain areas) may ultimately 
create a more notable drag on innovation and related development of quality patents in China than 
if such polices were replaced with more palatable ones.  
                                                                                                                                                                            
Case Western Reserve University. Retrieved from University of Colorado, Department of Economics. Web site: 
http://www.colorado.edu/Economics/mcguire/workingpapers/cwrurev.doc). McDaniel (1999) finds that in large markets 
with both high potential returns on investment (ROI), although firms prefer to utilise FDI despite its comparatively higher 
fixed costs, as opposed to licensing which has lower fixed costs but also a lower ROI, if uncertainty surrounds security of 
patent rights (even in countries with a high market potential, as in Japan in the 1980s and 1990s), IPR licensing is used as 
an alternative to patent transfer via FDI given too much IPR leakage in the latter. (Source: McDaniel, C. (1999). Inventing 
around and impacts on modes of entry in Japan: A cross-country analysis of U.S. affiliate sales and licensing. Office of 
Economics Study, USITC. Retrieved from http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/working_papers/EC9911A.PDF). Among 
other sources discussing related phenomena, see Maskus (1998).  
41 13 March 2012 - Consultations with several European Chamber members in Shanghai 
42  INSME. (2011).Technology transfer to China: Guidance for businesses. Retrieved from http://insme.org/insme-
newsletter/2011/file-e-allegati/newsletter_documents/Technology_transfer_to_China_FINAL.pdf 
43 2012, March 23- Consultations on SMEs’ internationalisation in China with a DG Enterprise representative  
44 Orrick. (2010, January). China income tax preferences for high/new-tech enterprises (HNTE). Orrick Tax Law Update. 
Retrieved from http://www.orrick.com/fileupload/2420.pdf 
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As noted in Box 4 in Chapter 1, Chinese and EU companies suggest that access to government-
sponsored sources of finance is critical in allowing them to boost patent creation and utilisation. 
Survey data from EU companies suggests that outside access to key talent, access to public grants, 
fiscal incentives, and public loans and guarantees are some of the most important factors affecting 
EU companies’ innovation plans and activities.45 Consultations also suggest that access to the 
aforementioned types of financial support is a key factor affecting many private Chinese companies’ 
(including those using IPR sometimes licensed from foreign entities) innovation plans and activities.46 
As such, in order to better attract certain innovators from the EU (particularly those that are not as 
well-funded as others), and also to fully stimulate many private Chinese enterprises, China’s 
innovation policies should be crafted in a way that does not unnecessarily exclude potential 
innovators; however, IND-IP-based IIPs do not appear to most objectively reflect these policy 
considerations. 
 
Further, to the extent that other countries have policies that do not overemphasise IND-IP-based IIP-
style polices which in effect may ‘crowd out’ licensing from abroad, they may pull in some licensed 
IPR that China could have otherwise realised without its IND IP IIPs. This may arise to the extent that 
IND-IP-based IIPs overly discourage IPR licensing, whereas IPR licensing is one important method to 
build innovation, and such an approach would discourage licensing spillovers that could lead to 
development of quality patents. There is solid potential for more licensing from foreign firms in 
China as well as those not yet in China but looking to expand there, whereas Giuri and Torrisi (2011) 
find there is still a significant potential for firms from high-income countries to license their patents 
in China, as gauged by their current plans to do so or lack of utilising such options as of yet. Amongst 
European firms in particular, roughly 24% have patents they apparently would be willing to license 
(although the data does not say to whom exactly) but have not yet done so.47  
 
The overemphasis conundrum also applies to the extent that IND-IP-based-IIPs might overly 
discourage policies stimulating “open innovation,” the concept that firms can share/use internal and 
external ideas and paths to advance their technology, which is sometimes considered to be hindered 
by less than optimal IPR regimes.48 Open innovation in some circumstances may better enable 
building breakthrough innovation and in the longer term also lead to quality patent filings.49  
 
Additionally, given the globalised nature of production chains at present, which are dispersed 
throughout a variety of countries and will likely inevitably continue to be dispersed to take 
advantage of comparative advantages, China’s justification for IND IP policies based on national 
economic and technological security may be less convincing than otherwise assumed. Specifically, 
licensing of technology and other forms of knowledge-sharing outside that necessitated by IND IP 
                                                        
45 European Commission, (2010), p. 17  
46 2012, April 17- Consultations with several members of the European Chamber in Shanghai 
47 Giuri, P., & Torrisi, S. (2011). The economic uses of patents. Munich, Final Conference of the InnoS&T project “Innovative 
S&T indicators for empirical models and policies: Combining patent data and surveys”; and WIPO (2011), p. 65 
48 Among others see: Lee, N., Nystén-Haarala, S., & Huhtilainen, L. (2010). Interfacing intellectual property rights and open 
innovation. Retrieved from http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/wipo_ipr_ge_11/wipo_ipr_ge_11_topic6.pdf 
49 Note: Herein, it should be considered that open innovation and other public disclosure of inventions are important for 
building-up innovation and leading to future quality patent filings. Baldwin and Von Hippel (2010) use empirical evidence 
to suggest that ownership of IPR is not as essential to innovation as perhaps assumed, whereas open source innovation can 
very much lead to key innovations. (Source: Baldwin, C. Y., & Von Hippel, E. A. (2010). Modeling a paradigm shift: From 
producer innovation to user and open collaborative innovation. Harvard Business School Finance Study, No. 10-038. 
Retrieved from http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1502864). WIPO (2011) also suggests that there can 
be a place for open innovation, for example, among research institutes and universities, to spur important innovations. 
Also, it is well-known that a significant amount of information used to build future patents is taken from publicly available 
information on already granted patents. As a result, an entity can benefit from open innovation and others’ patent filings in 
creating its own innovation.  
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requirements are increasingly underpinning much of the global operations of many entities of many 
nationalities. 
 
Fourth, IND-IP-based IIPs may be in violation of WTO rules, particularly Article 3 (on national 
treatment) of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement, and thus 
if effectively challenged will need to be replaced by a strategy that less discriminatorily attempts to 
promote innovation.50 It may be prudent for alternative strategies for boosting innovation and 
quality patents to already start taking the places of these type of IIPs rather than allowing them to 
exist as a core part of China’s innovation policy and thus preempting any lags in efficiency that might 
result between required nullification of the policies and crafting more appropriate new ones.   
 
Side note: So what policy tools might encourage IP transfers? 
 
As IP transfers were mentioned earlier in this section, it should be noted that promoting trade gains 
may be one alternative to encourage IP transfers. Galasso et al. (2001) finds that patents with higher 
potential gains from trade are more likely to experience a change in ownership.51 As such, there is at 
least some indication that if the authorities can build the economy in a way that provides further 
trade gains, foreign companies then could increasingly transfer IP ownership to China-based entities. 
This said, it is important to contextualise Galasso et al. (2001) with the findings of Hu (2008) and the 
other innovation trend-related background information in Chapter 1 of this study.52  
Ⅲ.3.1.1.1.3 CFTDF and similar subsidies 
 
There is concerning evidence of large Chinese subsidy funds that are built on discriminatory IND-IP-
based requirements as well as continent on export performance. Some of these subsidies fall within 
China’s Central Foreign Trade Development Fund (CFTDF), a large fund investigated in this study 
which has surprisingly seemed to fly under the radar of most observers.53 According to a Chinese 
government-supported audit report, it appears that up until 2004 the income from quota bidding (a 
typical funding source for China’s subsidy programs) channelled into the CFTDF reached RMB 37.7 
billion, among which RMB 29.5 billion had been allocated to enterprises qualifying for the fund. Only 
RMB 3.5 billion, or 12% of the amount allocated to enterprises qualifying for the fund, was 
distributed in the form of loans, whereas RMB 25.7 billion of the fund was very likely given in the 
form of grants. These monies were given to 247 projects, and out of those projects 103 (41.7% of the 
                                                        
50 For one analysis of a potential WTO case herein see: An, S., & Peck, B. (2011). China’s indigenous innovation policy in the 
context of its WTO obligations and commitments. Georgetown Journal of International Law. Retrieved on March 30, 2012 
from http://gjil.org/wp-content/uploads/archives/42.2/ChinasIndigenousInnovation.pdf. (pp 437-442 of that paper note 
that certain IP-specific provisions in China’s IIPs appear to be in violation of Article 3 as well as Article 27.1 of the TRIPS 
Agreement). Note: In the opinion of this study, IND IP requirements may conceivably conflict with Article 3 of TRIPS, which 
stipulates national treatment of “protection” of IPR (however, an argument based upon Article 27.1 seems less convincing). 
As a very important caveat, however, it would be absolutely necessary to fully investigate how Footnote 3 in Article 3 of 
TRIPS is intended to be applied, whereas that footnote defines “protection” of IPR as: “For the purposes of Articles 3 and 4, 
"protection" shall include matters affecting the availability, acquisition, scope, maintenance and enforcement of intellectual 
property rights as well as those matters affecting the use of intellectual property rights specifically addressed in this 
Agreement.” A further analysis of these dynamics is well beyond the scope of this study.   
51 Galasso, A., Schankerman, M., & Serrano, C. J. (2011). Trading and enforcing patent rights. Retrieved from 
http://www.economics.utoronto.ca/serrano/papers/GSS_paper.pdf 
52 Note: Recall Hu (2008) finds that patent filing trends in China do not follow the market covering hypothesis; however, Hu 
(2008) focuses on IP filings, whereas the findings in Galasso et al. (2001) relate to IPR ownership transfer (post-filings). As 
such, Hu (2008) does not necessarily challenge the aforementioned findings. 
53 See Prud’homme, D. (2012, forthcoming). The biggest subsidy scheme nobody’s heard of: China’s Central Foreign Trade 
Development Fund. European Chamber Working Paper. Note: many subsidies herein are clearly discriminatory and violate 
WTO obligations in the SCM Agreement, namely Article 3 on prohibited subsides and Article 5 on actionable subsidies, and 
as related to export subsidies in some cases conflicts with Paragraphs 166 and 167 of the Report of the Working Party on 
the Accession of China. 
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projects which received loans) did not even repay their fund loans on time (thus the amount of un-
repaid loans to the CFTDF totalled RMB 980 million, which was 27.66% of the total funds distributed 
for loans).54  
 
Some examples of these discriminatory subsidies are listed below: 
 
 Administrative Measures for Research and Development Fund of Export Products issued by 
MOF and the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (former version of 
MOFCOM), which is one of the earliest relevant measures found during research for this 
study, and is still effective:55 
 
Article 2: “The term export R&D funds in this measure means the government funds 
drawn from the Central Foreign Trade Development Fund as a subsidy that does not 
need to be repaid to support research and development of export products.” 
 
Article 8:  “The export R&D funds will as a matter of priority provide subsidies for 
enterprises and projects meeting the following conditions: 
(1) According to Customs statistics, last year’s export volume accounts for more than 
50% of the total sales revenue or exports are worth more than 15 million U.S. 
dollars… 
(5) Have indigenous intellectual property rights…”56 
 
 Application Guidance for Fund for the Optimisation of Import & Export of Machinery & 
Electrical Product and High-Tech Products, issued on September 3rd 2007 by MOFCOM and 
MoF, which provides free financing of labor costs, equipment costs, fuel and power costs, 
rental fees, testing fees, material fees, “commissioned development fees”, and “appraisal 
and acceptance fees.” The main IND-IP-based and export restrictions for qualifying for these 
funds are: 
 
Part 4, Article 4: “an R&D project must…generic technology programs should have 
indigenous intellectual property and related entities should have clear intellectual 
property rights.” 
 
Part 2, Section 2, criteria 2: “…last year’s exports accounted for more than 50% of 
the total sales revenue or enterprise exports more than 15 million U.S. dollars.  
 
Part 2, Section 4: “Special funding support includes: 
Article 4.1: Free financing; 
Article 4.5: The amount of subsidy for construction programs for base public service 
platforms average no more than 10 million RMB, significant programs no more than 
20 million RMB, and the amount of subsidies for single enterprise programs average 
no more than 3 million RMB. 
Article 4.7: Funds will be appropriated in two stages: first for 60% of funds after 
approval, and the other 40% funds will be given after programs are accomplished 
and qualifications are verified.”57 
                                                        
54 Shandong Institute of Internal Audits. (2005, November 4). Audit shows the disadvantages of Foreign Trade Funds. 
Beijing News. Retrieved on April 15, 2012 from http://www.sdiia.gov.cn/yznews/showdetail.apx?id=4543 
55 No readily available notice appears to be issued nullifying or superseding the measure when last checked on August 17, 
2012. 
56 Promulgated on November 27, 2002, last retrieved on April 30, 2012 from 
http://www.zwgk.suzhou.gov.cn/dpt/show.asp?ID=18598 Note 1: Translation from the European Chamber thus is 
unofficial. Note 2: There is no definition of the term “indigenous intellectual property” in the measure itself. 
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 Notice on Good Performance of the Construction Fund for Guangdong Export Bases of 
Agricultural, Light Industry and Textile Products for the year of 2011 issued on June 14th 2011 
by the Department of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation of Guangdong Province and 
Department of Finance of Guangdong Province: 
 
Section 1, Part 1: “The source of the fund for agricultural, light industry and textile 
products is the Guangdong Foreign Trade Development Promotion Fund according to 
the new provincial financial arrangements of Guangdong….”  
Section 1, Part 2: “The fund is implemented and managed by programs and the fund 
is used as a grant…” 
Section 1, Part 3, Para. 1: “….The support scope of the funding includes covering the 
expenditure for instruments and equipment (not for production use), software, 
expert advice and information and certification needed for R&D, design, quality 
control, and product testing of export enterprises as well as the expenditure such as 
venue rental costs for activities.” 
 
Section 3, Para. 3: “The enterprises that apply for the public technology platform 
program for agriculture, light industry and textile product export should have 
indigenous intellectual property rights…”58 
 
As mentioned, the above list is non-exhaustive. In fact, research for this study has uncovered a 
variety of other policies existing under the CFTDF that include IND-IP-based requirements, as well as 
export and other preconditions for receiving subsidies.59  
 
Further, it is worth further investigating if such subsidies, or related subsidies, are linked or will be 
linked to targets in certain recent provincial IP plans and strategies (e.g. Provincial/Municipal 12th 
Five Year IP Plans reviewed in this study, different components of which are mentioned in the 
“Chapter 2” and “Chapter 3” sections in the Annex).60 In fact, this link would not necessarily be a new 
policy initiative. For example, although less than 100% explicit, it appears to still be relatively clear 
from a number of recent past measures, like the below-mentioned measure, that Chinese policy 
targets for IND IP and export growth have a history of being linked to CFTDF subsidies:  
 
 Opinions on Accelerating the Transformation of the Export Growth of Electromechanical 
Products within the period of Eleventh Five Year, issued on May 27th 2006 by MOFCOM, 
NDRC, MoST, MoF, MIIT, the People’s Bank of China (PBoC), General Administration of 
Customs (GAC), State Administration of Taxation (SAT), and General Administration of 
Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ): 
 
Section 1, Article 2: “…by 2010 the export volume of high-tech electromechanical 
products to account for 55% of the total export…the proportion of export 
                                                                                                                                                                            
57  Retrieved on April 22, 2012 from http://www.smes-tp.com/Article_Show.asp?ArticleID=32448 Notes: Translation from 
the European Chamber thus is unofficial. This measure was only intended to be effective in 2007. There is no definition of 
the term “indigenous intellectual property rights” in the measure itself. 
58 Retrieved on April 30, 2012 from http://www.gddoftec.gov.cn/admin/UploadFile/2011621161019379.pdf Notes: 
Translation from the European Chamber thus is unofficial. This measure was only intended to be effective in 2011. There is 
no definition of the term “indigenous intellectual property rights” in the measure itself. 
59 Note: While these aforementioned criteria may be concerning, it is important to note that some of these measures 
include criterion for R&D output, which as mentioned in the IND-IP-based IIPs section and related Recommendations in this 
Chapter in fact is, in the view of this study, a useful criterion for innovation funding. 
60 For example, among others, an indicator in Hunan’s Provincial Intellectual Property Strategies Outline of February 26, 
2009 sets forth an objective that “indigenous intellectual property rights and indigenous brands’ exports to 
reach ≥ 20% and ≥ 50% respectively of total export volume.” (see the “Chapter 2” section in the Annex for further indicators 
from provincial IP proposals.) 
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electromechanical products which own indigenous brands and indigenous 
intellectual property rights to account for 20% of the total export volume of 
electromechanical products.” 
 
Section 5, Article 18: “Continue to annually withdraw a sum of money from the 
Central Foreign Trade Development Fund to mainly support the R&D and subsidised 
loans of technical transformation of export electromechanical products, and when 
conditions permit, localities should also be given financial support.”61 
 
From one vantage point, the aforementioned subsidy schemes indeed might help to build domestic 
enterprises, given self-owned brands, self-owned patent rights, and sales records collectively can be 
a metric of the competitiveness of an entity. So rewarding enterprises meeting such criteria might 
seem like an obviously useful incentive. 
 
However, for the same four reasons mentioned in the previous IND-IP-based IIPs section, with some 
supplemental details to those reasons, it appears that the abovementioned subsidy approaches will 
not necessarily best encourage quality patent filings and related innovation in the ways ostensibly 
envisaged. Regarding the differences in details, in terms of the fourth reason from the IIPs section on 
WTO conflicts, the subsidies mentioned in this section not only potentially contradict the TRIPS 
Agreement but are also clearly in contradiction with Article 3 of the WTO’s Subsidies and 
Countervailing Duties (SCM) Agreement, among other provisions in China’s WTO commitments.62 
(And note that the above cited measures were not specifically mentioned in the apparently resolved 
case filed against China on its China World Top Brand Programme and Chinese Famous Export Brand 
Programme.63) Thus, replacement strategies will need to be put in place by the Chinese authorities if 
these and related subsidy policies and their implementing measures are effectively challenged.64  
 
Additionally, requiring patent-ownership-related criteria for high-exporting enterprises may be 
unnecessary as it may not establish innovation and competitiveness-building incentives in the most 
efficient and effective ways. Specifically, empirical evidence across a range of countries suggests that 
export capacity is already one of the most statistically significant indicators of patent filings.65 As 
                                                        
61 Retrieved on May 16, 2012 from http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/difang/ningxia/200609/20060903039965.html 
Notes: Translation from the European Chamber thus is unofficial. Although there appears to be no readily available notice 
that invalidates this measure, it inferably was only intended to be effective during the time of 11th Five Year Plan (i.e. 2006-
2011). There is no definition of the term “indigenous intellectual property rights” in the measure itself. 
62 Several subsidies in the CFTDF violate WTO commitments in the SCM Agreement, namely Article 3 on prohibited 
subsides and Article 5 on actionable subsidies, and as related to export subsidies in some cases conflicts with Paragraphs 
166 and 167 of the Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China. (Source: Prud’homme (forthcoming 2012)) 
63 Specifically, DS387, initiated by the US on December 19th 2008 and joined by Australia, Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, the 
European Communities, Guatemala, Mexico, New Zealand and Turkey in January 2009. The press reported the USTR signed 
an agreement with China to remove “numerous subsidies” mentioned in the DS387 case (source: China resolves WTO case 
by ending subsidies on ‘famous brands’. (2009, December 20). Bloomberg. Retrieved from http://www.business-
standard.com/india/news/china-resolves-wto-case-by-ending-subsidies%5Cfamous-brands%5C/380109/). USTR (2011), pp 
70-71, also note that the case was resolved in December 2009. This was further confirmed in the author’s consultations 
with a representative from USTR in March 2011. For details of the request for consultations evidence see: WTO. (2009, 
January 7). China – Grants, loans and other incentives: Request for consultations by the United States. WT/DS387/1. 
(Document No 09-0022, pp. 1-18). Retrieved from http://docsonline.wto.org  
64 Note: The reason such subsidies are not allowed under the WTO framework is not necessarily that they do not “work at 
all” in building-up enterprises, although some certainly argue this, rather that countries have agreed to mutually limit 
discriminatory rules with a view to allowing market forces and more ‘neutral’ support mechanisms to determine the most 
competitive industries. 
65 Note 1: Blind (2006) looks at patent applications at the European Patent Office (EPO) and finds an upsurge in patent 
activities cannot be explained by expansion in R&D expenditures, but rather the most powerful indicator of international 
patent applications is export volumes. (Source: Blind, K. (2006). Chapter 5: Driving forces of patent applications at the 
European Patent Office: a sectoral approach. In Hingley, P., & Nicolas, M., Forecasting innovations: Methods for predicting 
numbers of patent filings, pp. 73-94. Heidelberg, Germany. Springer.) Note 2: Encaoua et al. (2000) also finds that 
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such, firms that export already have the incentive to protect their patents (and trademarks, and 
other forms of IP) abroad without such CFTDF subsidies. This said, perhaps surprisingly, it is apparent 
that some Chinese firms, for example some SMEs, that export knowledge-intensive goods and 
services abroad do not actually register their IPR abroad.66  Either way, given the previously 
mentioned drawbacks in the specific subsidies, such funds might better be used to build-up 
innovative enterprises and support patent quality in different ways not necessarily based on IND IP 
export criteria.67 
Ⅲ.3.1.1.1.4 Sub-central level incentives for IP development 
 
Just based upon the recent IP proposals reviewed for this study, it is clear that many provinces in 
China have set-forth special award programs and are intent on utilising a number of financial 
incentives to spur development of quality patents. Many of these initiatives seem commendable. For 
example, Anhui sets out an Anhui Patent award “to improve patent quality” and Hebei notes the 
need to calibrate financial funding for patent initiatives based upon differences in enterprises size, 
location and stage of development. Jiangsu looks into establishing a “Patent Bank;” sets out an 
initiative that registered patent intermediary service organisations engaged in patent technology 
development and other practices can be exempted from the business tax (BT) and education 
surcharge; notes that financial investment in developing IP should outpace immediate ROI; among 
others. Liaoning promotes a 500,000 RMB Gold Award for China Patents and a 200,000 RMB China 
Patent Excellence Award. Ningxia promotes similar awards to Liaoning, and mentions setting-up 
special funds to stimulate invention patents. A number of provinces provide funding specifically for 
registering patents abroad. Other IP proposals reviewed also have seemingly relatively well-aimed 
financial funds to build patent quality. (Note: these award programs are not concerning if they do 
not include IND IP-type criteria.) 
 
There are also provinces/municipalities that while setting out some commendable initiatives in the 
provincial/municipal IP proposals reviewed in this study also set out potentially concerning 
provisions. For example, on one hand, Tianjin’s 12th Five Year IP Plan (from 2011), sets forth a variety 
of interesting financial plans, including a “Tianjin Patent Award,” “Worker Inventor Award,” “Women 
Inventor Award,” and “Juvenile Inventor Award,” and promotes the “One Award, Two 
Remuneration” system.68 However, on the other hand, the Tianjin plan also sets out advice that 
funding from specific government funds from the key technology invention project fund, science and 
technology invention fund, and technology invention fund for SMEs should “tilt towards enterprises 
with indigenous intellectual property rights.” Table 13 below illustrates these financial incentives. 
                                                                                                                                                                            
propensity to patent solutions rises as exports rise, whereas exporting firms face more competition and thus increasingly 
need to protect knowledge-based resources (Source: See Encaoua, D., Hall, B. H., Laisney, F., & Mairesse, J. et. (2000). The 
economics and econometrics of innovation. Dordrecht, Netherlands. Kluwer Academic Publishers.) 
66 Consultations with several Chinese companies in the nutrition and machinery industries on April 12th 2012 and April 18th 
2012. Note: Without government consultations it is unclear how much this phenomenon plays into the rationale behind 
the aforementioned subsidy policies. 
67 To be sure, for the reasons mentioned, this is despite the fact that, as found in Girma et al. (2009), export subsidies at 
large (although not necessarily those in the CFTDF specifically) could indeed boost exports of Chinese firms in capital-
intensive industries that may see certain levels of innovativeness. (Source: Girma, S., Gong, Y., Gorg, H., & Yu, Z. (2009). 
Can production subsidies explain China’s export performance? Evidence from first-level data. The Scandinavian Journal of 
Economics, Issue 4, 863-891. Retrieved from http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9442.2009.01586.x/full) 
68 Note: this system appears grounded in the Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Rules for Implementation of the 
Patent Law, the revised version of which was issued on January 9th 2010 by the State Council and took effect on February 1, 
2010. Specifically, see Part 6, Article 76, 77, and 78 (as well as Article 16 of the Patent Law). For an English translation of 
the measures see: http://www.ccpit-patent.com.cn/references/Implementing_Regulations_Patent_Law_China.htm   
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The IND-IP-based funding approaches in such types of proposals may raise the types of concerns 
discussed in the previous IND-IP-based IIPs section.69  
 
Table 13: Example financial incentives for patent development from recent IP proposals reviewed 
Province/Municipality Financial incentives for patent development 
Tianjin  From IP Plan issued in 2011:  
Section 4, Part 6, Article 1: “Improving patent quantity and quality…enacting the 
‘Tianjin Implementation Measures on the Ownership and the Bonus and 
Payment System of Service Invention-Creations.’ Implement the ‘One award, 
Two remunerations’ system and other relevant regulations. Encourage annual 
growth rates of enterprise patent applications up to 20%.” 
 
Section 5, Article 3: “Greatly publicise and recognise the institutions and 
individuals who contribute outstandingly to the field of intellectual property, 
strengthening the influence of awards such as the Tianjin Patent Award, Worker 
Inventor Award, Women Inventor Award, and Juvenile Inventor Award. Setting 
forth a wide distribution of awards including taking shares in the form of 
intellectual property rights; accelerating the forming of a new distribution 
system which will stimulate inventions and the implementation of patent 
transformation.” 
 
Section 5, Article 4: “…Strengthen the significance of intellectual property in 
science and technology awards …Special funds such as the key technology 
invention project fund, science and technology invention fund, technology 
invention fund for technological SMEs, and government financial funds should 
tilt towards enterprises with indigenous intellectual property rights. ” 
Source: Author’s selection of articles from provincial/municipal 12th Five Year Intellectual Property Rights Plans 
and IP Strategies. A non-exhaustive list of other articles from provincial/municipal 12th Five Year IP Plans, IP 
Strategies, and equivalent/related policies that mention financial incentives for IPR development are listed in 
the “Chapter 3” section in the Annex. Translations are from the European Chamber thus are unofficial. 
 
Additionally, while not necessarily overtly concerning, per se, there are a range of incentives, 
including but not limited to financial incentives, often offered at the municipal and local levels to 
spur inventions, directly and indirectly intended to encourage patent applications, the usefulness 
and workings of which deserve further investigation with their implementing authorities. For 
example, according to regulations like the 2012 Grading Policy for Non-Shanghainese College 
Graduates of Obtaining Employment in Shanghai, issued in May 2012 during the Joint Meeting on 
the Employment of Shanghai College Graduates, students and workers who file patents are more 
likely to earn a hukou, a Chinese residence permit which restricts workers from moving to cities they 
are not originally from.70 Sources find that professors who own patents are more likely to win 
tenure.71 Applicants to research universities and institutes are given preference in admission if they 
file more patents.72 Companies with patents are more likely to win big government contracts.73 
                                                        
69 Note: While the Tianjin 12th Five Year IP Plan does not explicitly define the term “indigenous intellectual property rights,” 
this term is defined by the Tianjin IPO (see Box 5). 
70 Under the measure, there is a standard score for non-Shanghainese college graduates, whereas if the score of the 
graduate has surpassed the standard score the graduate can apply for a Shanghai hukou, and if the score does not surpass 
the standard score the graduate can only apply for a “Shanghai Residence Permit for Talents.” The measure sets forth the 
following criteria within this scoring system: Section 2, Part 4: “Has an invention patent certificate: 5 points; has a utility 
model patent certificate: 1 point; has a design patent certificate: 1 point; has a design patent certificate and is employed by 
a unit in the creative design industry: 3 points.”            
71 Innovation in China: Patents, yes; ideas, maybe. (2010, October 14). The Economist. Retrieved from 
http://www.economist.com/node/17257940 
72 Gao et al. (2011), p. 87 
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Governments offer individual patent filers incentives such as housing support, 74  and 
provincial/municipal governments may offer land and rental subsidies for certain companies in 
“innovative” industries.75 According to national-level law, prisoners, even those with life sentences, 
can commute their sentences if they produce “inventions or major technological renovations” and 
there is evidence sub-central levels have created implementing measures for this allowance.76  
 
Without a comprehensive assessment on how all financial incentives of all provinces/municipalities 
in China are actually implemented and working in practice, if they have even been implemented yet, 
it is not possible to fully assess if they are most efficiently and effectively using government 
resources to stimulate patent quality more so than quantity. However, it appears a variety of 
incentives deserve to be better linked with patent quality metrics in order to be most sustainable, i.e. 
adopt higher thresholds for which only quality patents are rewarded. It is worth exploring related 
dynamics herein with the authorities. As a small part of this discussion, it is worth exploring if more 
sustainable approaches than some of those set out at present might be adopted to make employers 
offer incentives to their employees to invent not just for the sake of producing patents but to also 
better contribute to the overall competitiveness of their company, or university or research institute, 
and China at large.  
 
Ⅲ.3.1.1.1.5 Large funds from MoST, NSFC, and other S&T-focused bodies 
 
Background  
 
China provides massive government funding for S&T, which in part is used to develop patents. As 
estimated in McGregor (2010), in 2008 China spent RMB 912 billion on S&T, accounting for 1.54% of 
GDP that year, whereas 21% of this was from government funding, divided roughly 50-50 among 
local and central levels; 70% was Chinese “enterprise” money; around 4% was loans from financial 
institutions; and the remaining expenditures were attributed to several other miscellaneous 
organisations. 77 It appears that from 2000-2006 61-73% of all government funding for science and 
technology was given to manufacturers of communication equipment, electronic equipment, 
transport equipment (including aerospace), and machinery (general purpose, special purpose and 
electrical).78  
                                                                                                                                                                            
73 The Economist (2010) 
74 Lohr, S. (2011, January 1). When innovation, too, is made in China. New York Times. Retrieved from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/02/business/02unboxed.html?_r=2&partner=TOPIXNEWS&ei=5099 
75 For example, see Chengdu HTDZ Investing in China – Government Policies. Retrieved from 
http://www.chengduhitech.co.uk/Guide/Government_Policies.asp  
76 This allowance is grounded in Article 78, para. 1 of Criminal Law of the P.R.C which states “A criminal element who is 
sentenced to control, criminal detention, fixed-term imprisonment or life imprisonment may have his sentence reduced if, 
during the period his punishment is being executed, he earnestly observes prison regulations, accepts reform through 
education, truly repents, or performs meritorious service. The sentence shall be reduced if any of the following meritorious 
services are performed: ….(3) making inventions or major technological renovations...For those sentenced to control, 
criminal detention, or fixed-term imprisonment, the term of the punishment actually to be executed may not, after 
reductions of sentence, be less than half of the term originally decided; for those sentenced to life imprisonment it may not 
be less than 10 years.” (emphasis added) As an example of implementation of this provision, the Gansu Prisons Bureau and 
Gansu Intellectual Property Department issued the Measures for the Rewards and Recognition of the Invention, Creation 
and Technical Innovation of Prisoners within the Period of Execution (Trial) on October 1st, 2009 (Source: news article on 
measure, although a copy of the actual measure could not be readily located, retrieved from 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/mtjj/2009/200908/t20090803_471159.html) 
77 McGregor, J. (2010). China’s drive for ‘indigenous innovation’: A web of industrial policies. US Chamber of Commerce; 
APCO Worldwide. p 17 and Annex 2, p. 44. Retrieved from 
http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/reports/100728chinareport_0.pdf 
78 Calculations using data from the 2004-2009 China Statistical Yearbook, 2007 China Statistical Yearbook on High 
Technology Industry, and 2000-2007 China Statistical Yearbook on Science & Technology. Note: “Government Funds” refer 
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A range of financial support that makes-up China’s public S&T funding overall appears, while there 
are exceptions, to be quite closed to foreign participation. Key S&T development programs overseen 
by MoST include the Key Technologies Program, 863 Program, 973 Program, Torch Program, and 
National Key Laboratories program. There are a variety of MoST spin-off programs from these 
programs. 79 The National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC), Chinese Academy of Sciences 
(CAS), and China Scholarship Council (CSC) all also have funding programs for research 
collaboration.80 Sources suggest most of these programs are in fact not open to foreign participation 
and have largely not been utilised much by foreign enterprises.81  
 
Issues with distribution requirements for such funding  
 
In some cases the aforementioned programs appear to be linked to patent-based criteria, which may 
be difficult for foreign entities (individuals, research institutes, or enterprises) to meet and which 
may not best stimulate quality patents and related innovation from any nationality of entity. For 
example, the Innovation Fund for Small Technology-based Firms (“Innofund”) is a main component 
of the Torch Program, and is linked to IND-IP-based requirements82 and is also contingent on an 
entity qualifying under the HNTE scheme,83  raising the concerns over these requirements as 
mentioned in the next section on HNTE status. By way of another example, the 973 program’s 
official government website indicates the program emphasises building “original innovations and 
indigenous intellectual properties in China’s research.”84 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
to those “obtained from government agencies at all levels to be used for S&T activities, including funds for scientific 
undertakings, funds for capital construction and scientific research, science fund, funds from education expenditures by 
education departments for S&T activities, and extra-budgetary funds from government agencies for S&T activities.” And 
“Science and Technology Activities” refers to “organised activities in the fields of natural sciences, agricultural science, 
medical science, engineering and technological sciences, humanities and social sciences, aimed to generate, develop and 
disseminate knowledge and technology. These activities can be divided into R&D, its subsequent outcome and 
application.” (Source: 2009 China Statistical Yearbook) 
79 For one resource on national funding programs see: ChinaAccess4EU National Funding Programs in Mainland China, 
retrieved from http://www.access4.eu/China/274.php. Also for some information on provincial/municipal plans see NSD 
Bio Group. (2009). Research report on Chinese high-tech industries. US China Economic and Security Review Commission. 
Retrieved from http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2009/Research_Report_on_Chinese_High_Tech_Industries.pdf 
80 Note: much of the funding from these entities is not given to private enterprises, whether Chinese or foreign. 
81 2012, March 6- Consultations with several R&D managers of large multinational companies involved in the European 
Chamber suggest they have not tapped into these funds. Discussions with the Chamber’s R&D Forum Chairs and Shanghai 
government authorities on May 17th 2012 suggest that foreign companies find ways of working effectively with Chinese 
universities and research institutes, and thus can sometimes access such funding through those cooperation activities. 
However, foreign companies typically find it very difficult to cooperate with Chinese enterprises – particularly SMEs – on 
S&T projects, and thus are not able to use that form of cooperation to access government S&T funding. Consultations with 
members of different working groups of the European Chamber on June 27th 2012 also confirm these findings. 
82 Notes: The Innofund is one of the main components of the Torch Program, and the fund provides financial grants in the 
forms of interest-subsidised loans and equity investment, among other subsidies. The Innofund is aimed at supporting 
technology innovation activities of small technology-based firms, facilitating transfer of research achievements, nurturing 
certain small technology-based firms and expediting the industrialisation of “new and high technology” enterprises. (For 
more information on this fund in English see: http://168.160.200.181/eng/ejym/MainContents.htm.) Article 6 of the 
Regulations on the Innovation Fund for Small Technology-based Firms (Provisional), issued by MoST and MoF on May 21st 
1999, which is still effective, states that indigenous intellectual property will be a core component in providing prioritised 
funding from the Innofund. This is the only place where intellectual property was mentioned in this Innofund measure. 
(Retrieved from http://www.innofund.gov.cn/innofile/se_02.asp.) Also see information on the Torch Hi-tech Industry 
Development Center of MoST at http://www.chinatorch.gov.cn/index.html and Recognition of Hi-tech Enterprises at 
http://www.innocom.gov.cn/web/(http://www.innocom.gov.cn/web/static/articles/catalog_3/2009-07-
28/article_2820410421c5bfc50121c7e174b90054/2820410421c5bfc50121c7e174b90054.html 
83 See Notice Regarding Lists of Companies Recognised as Key High-and-New Technology Enterprises (HNTEs) of the 
National Torch Program in 2010 issued on December 8th 2010 (effective till 2013), retrieved from 
http://www.innocom.gov.cn/web/static/articles/catalog_2/2010-12-
09/article_282041042cb0ab79012ccaa9706c000f/282041042cb0ab79012ccaa9706c000f.html 
84 The Implementation Results of the 973 Program, retrieved from http://www.973.gov.cn/English/Index.aspx  
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There are a number of other restrictions on Chinese government-funded S&T projects that in some 
cases lessen the effectiveness of such projects’ ability to build quality patents. Article 20 of the Law 
on Scientific and Technological Progress, amendments on which were effective as of January 2008, 
plainly stipulates the Chinese government must own technology resulting from research 
partnerships that tap into government S&T funds and are relevant to “national interests,” a concept 
distinguished from national security and public interests. 85  Sources suggest that government 
approval is required before one can exclusively license IPR resulting from government-funded S&T 
projects to foreign entities. Further, there is concern that money or other support from SOEs or 
universities used to fund research projects may also be considered in certain circumstances as 
“government funding” and thus be subject to the aforementioned restrictions.86 While some of the 
aforementioned requirements may be grounded in good-intentioned policy rationales, they are 
arguably overly broad and thus create regulatory/business planning uncertainties, business 
transaction costs, and, generally, somewhat worsen the perception of the IPR protection 
environment in China.  
 
In contrast, under the EC’s rules for funding research and technological development and 
demonstration, project partners are entitled to own the knowledge produced from the projects. 
Beyond this, it is only required that the project partners reach an agreement among themselves on 
IP ownership and licensing, whereas IP ownership transfer and licensing is explicitly allowed under 
the EC rules.87 This difference of treatment in research and technological development programs in 
the EU vs. China appears to be in conflict with several provisions in the Agreement for Scientific and 
Technological Cooperation Between the European Community and the Government of the People’s 
Republic of China.88 Generally, the aforementioned restrictions likely to some degree explain why 
many foreign enterprises and perhaps a range of domestic enterprises are not utilising the Chinese 
programs more, and thus why such programs are in some ways not as efficient and effective in 
contributing to development of quality patents and related innovation in China as they might be 
without such restrictions. 
 
Several other concerns likely further explain why China’s S&T technology funding programs are not 
most efficiently or effectively contributing to the development of quality patents. Some sources 
suggest that if an R&D partner (e.g. a university) is not just working on a service invention but 
                                                        
85 Text of Article 20: “With respect to the invention patent, computer software copyright, exclusive right to layout design of 
integrated circuits and new variety right of plants that is formed through a project supported by the science and technology 
foundation or the science and technology program sponsored by treasury money, the project undertaker may obtain 
relevant intellectual property rights except those concerning national security, national interests or important public 
interests. [para.2] The project undertaker shall implement the intellectual property rights stipulated in the preceding 
paragraph according to law, simultaneously adopt protective measures, and submit an annual report on implementing and 
protecting relevant intellectual property rights to the department in charge of the project; if the project undertaker fails to 
implement intellectual property rights, the state may implement them free of charge or may license others to implement 
them with charge or free of charge.[para.3] With respect to the intellectual property rights obtained by the project 
undertaker according to Paragraph 1 of this Article, for the purpose of national security, national interests or important 
public interests, the state may implement them free of charge or license others to implement them with charge or free of 
charge...” (emphasis added). For one English translation of the amended law see: 
http://www.china.org.cn/china/LegislationsForm2001-2010/2011-02/11/content_21899295.htm.  
86 Wang, B. (2012, February 13-14). Working with Chinese Universities – IP issues in agreements. [Presentation]. 3rd 
Advanced China IP Counsel Forum, Shanghai; and Lutze, O., Wang, B., Xu, C., & Carnabuci, C. (2012, February 13-14). 
Collaborative research with Chinese Universities: How to create a win-win working relationship. [panel discussion]. 3rd 
Advanced China IP Counsel Forum, Shanghai 
87 European Commission [EC]. Guide to intellectual property rules for FP7 projects (Version 3). Retrieved from 
ftp://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/fp7/docs/ipr_en.pdf 
88 For example, see Article 3 (b) “reciprocal access to the activities of research and technological development undertaken 
by each Party”; and Annex: Intellectual Property Rights -- Part II, Article 3 (c) “non-discriminatory treatment of participants 
from the other Party as compared with the treatment given to its own participants.” (Source: Agreement as published in 
the Official Journal of the European Communities on January 11th 2000, retrieved from 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/downloadFile.do?fullText=yes&treatyTransId=784) 
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performing other technological inventing, it can be difficult for one’s company to enjoy exclusivity on 
the resulting invention(s).89 Collectively, this and the aforementioned restrictions, help explain why 
China’s government-funded S&T programs are in some ways not as efficient and effective in 
contributing to development of quality patents as they might be without such restrictions. This is 
compounded by a variety of other factors, for example difficulties companies face when navigating 
partner university/research institutions’ internal restrictions on profit-sharing and IP ownership and 
licensing agreements with external partners; and ensuring that the appropriate entities are 
identified that can legitimately sign a contract on behalf of the university/research institute targeted; 
and lack of visible and condensed information in European languages on all China’s state-funded S&T 
programs.90 
 
Lastly, and more generally, some sources find that China’s S&T system has overly prioritised 
commercalisation in a way that hurts development of basic research and research otherwise chiefly 
intended for the public good, which in turn hampers the development of quality patents. Chen and 
Kenney (2007) and Zhong and Yang (2007) find that application-oriented research institutes in China 
have benefitted most from changes in China’s innovation policy, whereas those engaged in basic 
research find it far more difficult to obtain government funding and attract top-level researchers.91 
 
Some recent revisions to the system? 
 
It is worth noting that some recent policy statements, in particular the 2012 National IP Strategy, 
appear to at least realise China’s current S&T funding system needs more reform, although it 
remains to be seen how these policies will be implemented in a way that better stimulates 
innovation and patent quality. In particular, provisions of relevance herein include Part 6, measure 
58 from SIPO on pilot assessments for IP in major S&T activities; Part 6, measure 60 from MoST on 
formulating specific regulations on IP management in major S&T projects; Part 6, measure 61 from 
MoST on reviewing and improving measures on managing IP in national S&T projects; and Part 6, 
measure 64 from MoST, MIIT, and SIPO for improving supervision, assessment and guidance on 
major S&T projects. It remains to be discussed with the authorities if some reforms to S&T funding 
systems proposed in Part 1, measure 1 and 2 of the 2012 National IP Strategy link obtainment of IP 
rights and indigenous innovation preferences together. (See the “Introduction” section in the Annex 
for full text of provisions.) 
Ⅲ.3.1.1.1.6 HNTE status 
 
The High and New Technology Enterprise (HNTE) status scheme is perhaps the most controversial 
set of tax rules also directly related to patent-quality issues. Under the HNTE scheme, qualifying 
enterprises pay a mere 15% tax rate (a 10% saving given the otherwise 25% Enterprise Income Tax 
[EIT] rate), receive a 150% ‘super’ deduction for R&D expenses, and a potential business tax (BT) 
deduction.92  The Administrative Measures for the Recognition of Hi-tech Enterprises93 and the Key 
                                                        
89 Wang (2012); and Lutze et al. (2012)  
90 As well as a lack of awareness of the programs, although certain projects, such as ChinaAccess4EU provide helpful 
information on a variety of these plans.  
91 Chen, K., & Kenney, M. (2007). Universities/research institutes and regional innovation systems: the cases of Beijing and 
Shenzhen. World Development, Vol. 35, 1056-74. Retrieved from 
http://www.mendeley.com/research/universitiesresearch-institutes-and-regional-innovation-systems-the-cases-of-beijing-
and-shenzhen/; Zhong, X., & Yang, X. (2007). Science and technology policy reform and its impact on China's national 
innovation system. Technology in Society, Vol. 29, 317-25. 
92 Chan and Liu (2012).  Also, it is worth noting there are tax preferences under the Technically Advanced Service 
Enterprises (TASE) status scheme, whereas those qualifying receive a 10% reduction on the EIT, up to 8% deduction on 
taxable income instead of the normal 2.5% allowance, and can carry forward unused deductions. 
93 Retrieved from http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2008-04/24/content_953215.htm  
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High-tech Fields With State Support, both issued on April 14th 2008 by MoST, MoF, and SAT 94 along 
with the Working Guidance on the Recognition of Hi-tech Enterprises, from MoST, MoF, and SAT 
promulgated on July 8th 2008,95 controversially define high-tech enterprises in need of key support 
as referred to in Article 28 of the Enterprise Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(hereafter the “EIT Law”). Specifically, Part V, Section I, para. 4 of the Appendix to the Working 
Guidance on the Recognition of Hi-tech Enterprises (the “HNTE Guidance”) stipulates qualifying 
enterprises must own “core” IP in China or have “worldwide rights to the exclusive use” of IP for 
five or more years.96 The guidance explicitly states that “No enterprise that does not have any 
independently developed core intellectual property will be recognised as a high-tech enterprise.”97 
Further, the HNTE Guidance and application form therein stipulates that on a 100 point scale for 
assessing enterprises for HNTE status, IP is worth 30 points with a minimum score of 70 needed.98  
These provisions on IP ownership and restricted licensing are overly burdensome. 
 
The HNTE regime may discourage patent development in China by denying foreign firms access to 
financial incentives on the basis of rational business decision-making. Foreign companies may prefer 
to license technology from abroad, and not only provide exclusive worldwide licenses, instead of 
transferring it via full-on ownership transfer agreements or exclusive worldwide licensing 
agreements. As such, the HNTE scheme requirements may in effect limit the ability of operations of 
foreign enterprises to produce quality patents that could ultimately spillover into benefiting China 
and further encouraging Chinese innovation and patents given they are denied access to financial 
incentives on the basis of rational business decision-making.  
 
Further, in practice, these clearly restrictive IP-related conditions are even more restrictive. 
Specifically, as also mentioned in the IND IP section, while "worldwide rights to exclusive use" is 
stipulated in the measures as a substitute for ownership of IP, this exception cannot be practically 
met because current Chinese law effectively prohibits an owner/licensor from retaining IP usage 
rights in a foreign jurisdiction and also prohibits any other person, including a subsidiary of an HNTE, 
from receiving a sublicense from the China licensee.99 This has led some, for example Deloitte 
(2008), to conclude it will be difficult for most China affiliates of multinational companies to obtain 
HNTE status.100 
 
                                                        
94 Retrieved from http://www.wjkc.gov.cn/E_ReadNews.asp?NewsID=485  
95 Retrieved from http://www.most.gov.cn/gxjscykfq/wj/200810/t20081029_64626.htm  
96 Part V, Section I, para. 4: (i) Independently developed core intellectual property: “The term ‘exclusive license’ as used in 
the Working Guidance means the licensee enjoys the worldwide rights to the exclusive use of the intellectual property 
(patents, software copyrights, proprietary rights to integrated circuit layout designs, new varieties of plants, and other 
rights) stipulated in the agreement for five years or more, during which period neither the licensor nor any third party shall 
be entitled to use such intellectual property.  (ii) Independently developed core intellectual property as referred to in the 
recognition of high-tech enterprises shall be owned rights registered within the territory of China, or shall represent an 
entitlement to an exclusive worldwide license for five years or more (the term for the relevant high-tech enterprise shall fall 
within the period of five or more years for which the exclusive license remains effective) and be within the period protected 
by Chinese law.” (emphasis added) 
Also, the Application for Recognition of Hi-tech Enterprises (in Annex 2 of the Appendix to the HNTE Guidance) clearly 
includes indigenous innovation-type definitions in its instructions for determining what constitutes high-tech 
enterprises: See Article 7: “The term ‘technology source’ refers to enterprises’ self-owned technology, other enterprises’ 
technology, central science and research institutes, local science and research institutes, colleges and universities, and 
enterprises’ innovation of imported technology and foreign technology.” (emphasis added) 
97 (Appendix) Part VI, Section (II), Article 1, Note 5 
98 See Chart in (Appendix) Part VI, and the “Form for expert evaluation in order to be a high-tech enterprise” in the 
Application for Recognition of Hi-tech Enterprises in Annex 4 of the Appendix to the HNTE Guidance  
99 See Orrick Tax Law Update (2010) 
100  Deloitte. (2008). China tax law commentary. Retrieved from http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-
UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/us_csg_chinataxlawcommentary_0808.pdf 
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Moreover, according to Part V, Section I, para. 1 of the Application for Recognition of Hi-tech 
Enterprises (in Annex 2 of the HNTE Guidance), utility models and design patents (and other types 
of IPR) can be used to meet the IPR requirements of HNTE status, which appear to overly encourage 
filing of these patents.101 There are certain restrictions on the aforementioned types of IPR in 
achieving HNTE status, and criterion in the Application Form in Annex 4 of the HNTE Guidance has 
been found to say that six non-invention patents (e.g. utility model patents) constitute one invention 
patent for the purposes of applying for HNTE status.102 However, the effectiveness of these criteria 
and the actual vetting process to ensure highest quality patents are used to apply for the HNTE 
program is dubious, as there is evidence that the system, while perhaps to some degree building 
quality patents, still favours less-than-highest-quality patents. For example, Chinese government 
consultations suggest that many enterprises simply use utility models instead of invention patents 
the purposes of applying for HNTE status.103 As such, the HNTE scheme at present very well may 
encourage filings of less-than-highest quality patents, whereas if reformed it could better stimulate 
highest-quality patents and related innovation. 
 
Ⅲ.3.1.1.2 Standardisation policies  
 
Discriminatory standard-making procedures, withholding information on standards, and 
discriminatory de jure standards and de facto application of standards have long been used to 
promote Chinese innovation; however, these initiatives stifle competition, potentially denying the 
Chinese market certain quality patents and sharing of know-how from foreign and domestic firms. 
Some key examples of these policies are listed below: 
 
 Restrictions on standard-making exclude enterprises from patent pools: Foreign-invested 
enterprises (FIEs) often do not have access to the Technical Committees in which 
standardisation is decided, and therefore cannot join patent pools.104  
 
 Information restrictions on patent-related requirements needed for implementing 
standards: For example, FIEs are unable to obtain information on the scope and 
requirements of patents to implement the standards which are frequently used in 
mandatory certification schemes. 105 
 
 Intentionally developing national standards based only on the capabilities of Chinese SOEs: 
By way of example from the ICT sector, specifically in the value-added telecoms and 
information security industries, standardisation is frequently and increasingly being used to 
promote patented Chinese technologies by developing national standards exclusively 
reflecting the capabilities of SOEs and certain private Chinese companies.106   
 
 Refusal of certain Chinese entities to license “essential patents”: Further on this particular 
point is discussed below. 
                                                        
101 (Appendix) Part V (“Other significant indices”), Section 1, para 1:  “Independently developed core intellectual property as 
referred to in the Recognition Measures includes inventions, utility models, designs in which the pattern and shape of a 
product is changed in a non-simple manner (which generally means designs generated by the application of scientific and 
engineering technology in the course of research and development), software copyrights, proprietary rights to integrated 
circuit layout designs and new varieties of plants.” (emphasis added) 
102 See category 1 in the “Form for expert evaluation in order to be a high-tech enterprise” in the Application for 
Recognition of Hi-tech Enterprises in Annex 4 of the Appendix to the HNTE Guidance. 
103 2011, October 28- Meeting with SIPO Commissioner Tian Lipu, other senior SIPO officials, and European Chamber 
representatives. 
104 European Chamber. (2012, 1 March). Internal document re March 5th meeting with the EC on “Prospects for the Service 
Sector in China.” 
105 Ibid  
106 Ibid 
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 Direct competitors have unnecessary access to IP submitted in application documents for 
chemical projects: The approval process for a chemical project in China above $300 million 
USD and also certain other projects involves local experts to evaluate the project and advise 
on its oversight. Expert selection is not transparent, whereas direct competitors of an 
applicant are often requested to join the advisory panel, thereby gaining access to 
confidential and proprietary information submitted in application documents. Compounding 
this is the fact that the high level of detail required in the process is well beyond the 
information released during a similar process in OECD countries.107 As such, it is not 
uncommon in this process that there is leakage of trade secrets and sometimes patented 
information to Chinese competitors who employ or have close relations with those experts 
on the aforementioned panels.108  
 
 Direct competitors have unnecessary access to IP submitted for approval of 
pharmaceuticals, and can delay approval of pharmaceuticals: Direct competitors of a firm 
applying for approval of a pharmaceutical sit on the State Food and Drug Administration 
(SFDA)’s approval panel for that pharmaceutical. These competitors thus have access to the 
wide range of IP-related information required to be submitted as part of the approval 
process, which raises obvious concerns about IP leakage. Additionally, it is reported that 
these direct competitors leverage their positions on the panel to delay approval of a 
pharmaceutical while they themselves push a similar or the same pharmaceutical through 
the approval process.109 
 
 IP leakage during CCC Mark accreditation:  China Compulsory Certification (CCC) Mark 
accreditation is a safety certification program covering a variety of product categories that is 
mandatory for such products to be sold in China. For years, foreign industry, particularly 
software encryption companies, have been required to disclose IP source codes in order be 
granted a CCC Mark.110 Although certain CCC Mark-related rules have been revised in recent 
years, for example in 2009, concerns persist over proprietary IPR leakage due to the fact that 
the changes still do not adequately reform the system.111 
 
 Domestic IP requirements in the MLPS: A variety of sources identify the Multi-Level 
Protection Scheme (MLPS) as problematic in that it includes domestic IP requirements that 
do not allow foreign companies to build a variety of Chinese infrastructure, whether as part 
of government procurement or commercial initiatives.112 In a related vein, sources complain 
that certain commercial encryption regulations do not allow foreign vendors to sell, produce 
or carry out R&D on encryption-related technology in China.113 
 
                                                        
107 European Chamber (2012, forthcoming). 2012/2013 Petrochemical, Chemical, and Refining (PCR) Working Group 
Position Paper. 
108 2012, May 9- Consultations with several members of the European Chamber 
109 2012, July 14– Consultations with a member of the European Chamber in Shanghai 
110 Linton et al. (2010) pp 4-13, 5-14, 5-17 
111 Hammer, A. et al. (2011). China: Effects of intellectual property infringement and indigenous innovation policies on the 
US Economy. USITC Investigation No. 332-519, pp 5-29. Retrieved from 
http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4226.pdf 
112 Among others see: Neuffer, J. (2011, June). Statement of John Neuffer on China’s Five-Year Plan, indigenous innovation 
and technology transfers and outsourcing. Hearing before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, pp. 78-
79. Retrieved from 
http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2011hearings/transcripts/11_06_15_trans/11_06_15_final_transcript.pdf; also see Wolf, A. 
(2011, May). Alan Wolff’s testimony on “China’s Indigenous Innovation Policy”. Hearing before the US-China Economic and 
Security Review Commission. Retrieved from 
http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2011hearings/written_testimonies/11_05_04_wrt/11_05_04_wollf_testimony.pdf 
113 Hammer (2011)  
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 Potentially disconcerting requirements involving TCM chips: China has developed its own 
Trusted Cryptography Module (TCM), a chip in computers to control security functions, and 
some worryingly suggest these may be required in products in China.114  
 
At large, the aforementioned approaches to Chinese standards impact patent quality by excluding 
many foreign and even Chinese companies that may or could be competitive in industries relying on 
related standards. The policies deny the market know-how, patents, and related innovations that 
would have been otherwise diffused or newly developed without such practices.  
 
Worse, the aforementioned approaches to Chinese standardisation may actively encourage 
initiatives that will ultimately fail domestically and/or fail during international expansion attempts, 
thus wasting resources, whereas this might have been avoided if standards were subject to more 
transparency and fuller consultation and otherwise more inclusive development. For example, this 
phenomenon clearly played out in the often cited case of China’s WLAN Authentication and Privacy 
Infrastructure (WAPI).115  
 
While there are inferably security and economic rationales for the aforementioned standardisation 
policies, these need not justify the level of discrimination in the policies that ultimately hinders 
developing quality patents and related innovation in China. On one hand, to some extent, 
reasonable Chinese security rationales underlie certain standards like the MLPS. Also, there are 
economic rationales that the aforementioned standards are needed to limit license fees paid to 
developers of international standards, provide an avenue for Chinese firms to earn IP-related 
revenues for making their own products and processes, among the other rationales mentioned in 
Box 6 in the IND-IP-based IIPs section. However, on the other hand, it could be argued that these 
similar objectives can be achieved, and in fact achieved more sustainably, through less 
discriminatory policies. 
 
Unwillingness of certain Chinese entities to license “essential patents” 
 
Further to the above discussion, it is important to note that China is increasingly seeking to develop 
what are often termed “essential” patents: patents containing one or more claims that are critical to 
the implementation of a technical specification or standard.116 For context, amongst members of 
standards-development/setting organisations (“SDOs” or “SSOs”), for example the European 
Telecommunication Standards Institute (ETSI), an owner of essential patents containing one or more 
claims that are essential to the implementation of a technical specification or standard should 
declare this relation and provide licenses on “fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory” (FRAND) 
conditions and terms, subject that the beneficiary also provides reciprocal access on essential 
patents he/she owns.117 Similarly, China has regulations stipulating that owners of essential patents 
should report if their patents are part of standard-setting or if their patents are otherwise involved 
in standards being developed; and such patents are required to either be licensed free-of-charge or 
below normal royalty rates.118 
 
                                                        
114 Wolff (2011), p. 18 
115 Although a variety of issues outside transparency in its creation also led to WAPI’s failure in being recognised as an 
international standard.   
116 Note the patents referred to herein are not necessarily only of the three types of patents granted in China. Also note 
that “essential patent” may be used in different contexts to, for example, referring to the general commercial 
competitiveness of the patent. 
117  Amar, C., & Puech, J. (2009, July 1). Licensing essential patents in the telecoms industry. Managing Intellectual Property 
Magazine. Retrieved from http://www.managingip.com/Article/2251048/Licensing-essential-patents-in-the-telecoms-
industry.html 
118 See the Standardisation Administration of the People’s Republic of China’s 2009 Regulations on Administration of 
Formulating and Revising National Standards Involving Patents 
Chapter 3: Dulling the Cutting Edge: How Patent-Related Policies and Practices Hamper Innovation in China 
 
103 
 
It is sometimes difficult form firms to acquire licenses to essential patents in China, which is a 
particularly pronounced problem hindering innovation and patent quality in industries with patent 
thickets. “Patent thickets,” the inter-relation between patents across of number of areas (e.g. among 
telecoms, semiconductors, and computing) are particularly prevalent in certain industries, for 
example the ICT industry, where implementation of even a single standard may require licenses of 
dozens or even hundreds of patents owned by multiple licensors.119 Despite a regulatory framework 
in place for licensing essential patents in China, in practice there are sometimes difficulties in 
accessing these patents. For example, European IP holders have continued to experience great 
difficulties in engaging the Chinese telecommunications industry in licensing discussions, while the 
latter has even made a coordinated effort recently to jointly delay or deny such 
discussions.120 Access to essential patents is critical in order for firms to operate in certain industries, 
particularly in those with patent thickets, and difficulties in accessing such patents hinder 
competition which can hamper development of quality patents and related innovation.  
 
On a related issue, there is an increasing acquisition of patents in China through non-practicing 
entities (NPEs), which in part means more standards will be owned by entities motivated only by the 
desire to monetise acquired patents.121 Improved Chinese regulation of NPEs may be needed to keep 
this concerning trend in check. These trends in some ways create an environment that alienates 
innovative firms, and therein can hamper China’s initiatives to build quality standards and patents. 
 
International standard-building regulations with IND IP requirements and subsidy components 
 
There are Chinese measures in place that encourage standardisation via potentially concerning IND-
IP-based requirements linked to significant subsidies. For example, the  Beijing Administrative 
Measures of the Special Subsidiary Funds for the Formulation (Revision) of Technology Standards, 
issued on November 13th 2006, by the Beijing MoF and Beijing Municipal Bureau of Quality and 
Technical Supervision, which still appears to be effective, states: 
 
Section 3, Article 6: “Article 6 allowance programs should be qualified for one of the 
following conditions…6.2 in line with Beijing key industries development; 6.3 taking 
advantages of advanced research results; 6.4 possessing indigenous intellectual property, 
beneficial for the forming of competitive industries and striving for the top within industry…  
 
Article 7: According to the innovation level of the standard initiative, individual subsidy 
awards for qualified standard projects are as follows:…  
 (6) Significant standard initiatives of great significance that are authorised and published 
could surpass the subsidies stipulated in Article 7.1-5 to be subsidised up to 1 million 
Yuan.”122  
 
                                                        
119 European Chamber. (2011). 2011/2012 Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Working Group Position Paper, p. 41. 
120 2012, May 14- Consultations with a representative in the telecom industry in the Chamber’s IPR Working Group 
121 European Chamber. (2011). 2011/2012 Standards and Conformity Assessment (SCA) Working Group Position Paper, 84-
85. 
122 Retrieved on June 15, 2012 http://www.bjtsb.gov.cn/infoview.asp?ViewID=2711 Notes: Translation is from the 
European Chamber thus is unofficial. There is no definition of the term “indigenous intellectual property” in the measure 
itself. Article 7.1-5 reads: “(1) Authorised and published in-line with international standards: a subsidy of no more than 
500,000 Yuan; (2) Authorised and published in line with national standards: a subsidy no more than RMB 300,000 Yuan; (3) 
Authorised and published in line with industrial standards: a subsidy no more than 200,000 Yuan; (4) Authorised and 
published in line with local standards: a subsidy no more than 200,000 Yuan; (5) An enterprise’s indigenously innovative 
technology which is approved in line with international, national, industrial and local standards: a special subsidy no more 
than 150,000 Yuan.” Note 3: Article 6.5 also applies the following conditions: “Through adopting, absorbing and 
transforming international standards or foreign advanced standards; meanwhile improving technology and re-innovating, 
and then establishing new international, state, industrial and local standards…”   
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The aforementioned measure may unintentionally drag down patent quality for the same reasons 
mentioned in the earlier section on standards, and the severity of this drag is compounded by the 
measure’s link to subsidies. The IND IP requirement as linked with subsidies, while indeed perhaps a 
useful way to encourage domestic enterprises’ unilateral development of standards, ultimately may 
limit the quality of the standards produced through an otherwise more competitive funding process. 
Also, for other reasons similar to those mentioned in the IND-IP-based IIPs discussion earlier in this 
Chapter, this approach can have a negative impact on patent quality and related innovation.  
 
Ⅲ.3.1.1.2.1 Raw deals involving patent ownership in closed sectors 
 
Sources suggest that in closed sectors (often de facto rather than de jure closed) where the only way 
of entry is through JVs with Chinese companies that dominate therein (usually SOEs), these 
dominant companies may leverage low quality patent portfolios in creating what is termed hereafter 
‘raw deals.’ For example, Chinese firms may leverage patent portfolios of dubious quality to get a 
better financial deal via demanding royalties while using their superior negotiating position to block 
due diligence on the contents of these patents.123 In the worst case scenario, the portfolio might be 
significantly composed of low-quality patents.  
 
This phenomenon is compounded by “forced” disclosure of know-how in raw deals. Foreign 
companies find themselves in weak negotiating positions when entering a closed sector, whereas 
their prospective Chinese JV partner may require they transfer key patented technology as a 
precondition to entering the JV.124 Also, sources suggest that Chinese partners may, among other 
tactics, require foreign partners open an R&D centre in China as a precondition for entering a JV.125 
Sources suggest that foreign firms, and perhaps private Chinese firms, often enter into these raw 
deals to win big projects, or in other instances certain authorities may pressure firms into 
transferring core technology by precluding them from enjoying preferential policies otherwise 
extended to enterprises engaging in certain business operations. For example, Atkinson (2012) cites 
an instance where a foreign firm was not allowed to qualify for alternative fuel vehicle purchase 
subsidies unless it transferred its electric motor, complex electronic controls, or power storage 
devices to a JV with a Chinese automaker.126  
 
According to some sources, the Chinese public procurement market is hotbed for raw deals involving 
quality patents. For example, Atkinson (2012) cites an instance where the Chinese government 
offered market access to a high-speed railway procurement project contingent on exchange for 
technology transfer, whereas the winning company was required to (ostensibly unreasonably) share 
its entire know-how and catalogue of technologies with Chinese engineers working on the project. 
To compound these concerns, sources suggest it is not uncommon for Chinese SOEs, after they 
acquire foreign technology through such raw deals, to utilise preferential government support to 
strategically displace foreign firms from the market. Specifically, Chinese firms may displace foreign 
competitors from the Chinese market via drawing on favorable government regulatory decisions, 
                                                        
123 Among other sources, see: China’s patent strategy worrying foreign firms. (2011, March 22). The China Post. Retrieved 
from http://www.chinapost.com.tw/china/business/2011/03/22/295534/Chinas-patent.htm. Note: In some ways, these 
practices are not necessarily intended to “promote” patents and innovation, but nonetheless can discourage quality 
patents and innovation.  
124 2012 February 15 - Consultations with several professional services’ consultants in Shanghai. Note: supra footnote 303. 
125 Atkinson, R. D. (2012, February). Enough is enough: Confronting Chinese innovation mercantilism. The Information 
Technology & Innovation Foundation [IITIF]. Retrieved from http://www2.itif.org/2012-enough-enough-chinese-
mercantilism.pdf 
126 Atkinson (2012), p. 34 
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and utilising what some alleged to be a depressed currency and other forms of subsidies to 
strategically displace the same (and other) firms in procurement bids overseas.127  
From one perspective, the raw deal approach might look sustainable as it could be argued that the 
Chinese market is ‘just too good to ignore/give-up’ for some companies’ business operations and 
thus they must agree to deals they would not have in other less promising markets. Indeed, there 
are clear examples of some of the most well-known multinational companies capitulating to these 
raw deals to take advantage of the market.128 After all, one might argue, ‘this is business, and this is 
China.’  
 
However, at large, the raw deal approach does not appear to be a sustainable for building 
innovation operations which involve patents. Forcing technology transfer has made Chinese firms 
more reliant on foreign technology. Worse, in the automobile industry for example, it has 
sometimes even made such Chinese firms lose the independent innovation capacity they may have 
once had.129 It is possible that the raw deal phenomenon creates a perverse incentive for Chinese 
companies to continue registering less-than-highest quality patents, and, at worst, low-quality 
patents. Prevalence of raw deals can make foreign entities in particular less likely to enter the 
Chinese market at all, pull out of the market, decide against transferring ownership or even licensing 
quality patents to Chinese entities, invest less in building-up highest-quality patents within JVs then 
they would have without the raw deals, and so on.  
 
The raw deal phenomenon also may very well increase the perceived urgency to protect techno-
economic security in foreign nations as further fanned by the flames of the current economic crisis. 
This could lead to further closing off and otherwise avoiding technology transfer to China. And some 
could consider the fact that market access for technology conditions like the type embodied in the 
aforementioned raw deals appear to be in conflict with WTO commitments in Article 7(3) of China’s 
Protocol of Accession and Paragraph 203 of its Working Party Report130 to be an additional argument 
for supporting stricter techno-economic security policies in response to such deals.  
 
Ⅲ.3.1.1.3 Ambiguities in technology import and export rules 
 
Rules governing improvements on technology  
 
The Regulations on Technology Import and Export Administration (hereafter “TIER”), adopted at the 
46th Executive Meeting of the State Council and publicly issued on December 10th 2001 and effective 
as of January 1st 2002, are discriminatory in requiring subsequent improvements on technological 
development in a contractual relationship be owned by the party making the improvements. 
Specifically, Article 27 thereto finds:  
                                                        
127 Atkinson (2012), p. 35 
128 For example, see Atkinson (2012), p. 34 
129 Testimony of Dan Breznitz (2012), p. 7 
130 See China’s Protocol of Accession, Article 7(3): “...Without prejudice to the relevant provisions of this Protocol, China 
shall ensure that the distribution of import licences, quotas, tariff-rate quotas, or any other means of approval for 
importation, the right of importation or investment by national and sub-national authorities, is not conditioned on: whether 
competing domestic suppliers of such products exist;  or performance requirements of any kind, such as local content, 
offsets, the transfer of technology, export performance or the conduct of research and development in China.”  (emphasis 
added). And Paragraph 203 of China’s Working Part Report: “….The allocation, permission or rights for importation and 
investment would not be conditional upon performance requirements set by national or sub-national authorities, or subject 
to secondary conditions covering, for example, the conduct of research, the provision of offsets or other forms of industrial 
compensation including specified types or volumes of business opportunities, the use of local inputs or the transfer of 
technology.” (emphasis added) 
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Article 27: “Within the term of validity of a contract for technology import, an achievement made 
in improving the technology concerned belongs to the party making the improvement.” 131 
 
The wording of Article 27 of the TIER creates notable ambiguity for firms working with others to 
innovate, particularly foreign firms working with Chinese entities, resulting in a drag on patent 
quality. As stated in the European Chamber’s forthcoming 2012/2013 IPR Working Group Position 
Paper, in general, while a licensor shall not restrict the licensee from conducting further research on 
the licensed technology and acquiring ownership rights on such improvements, Article 27 has been 
found to be problematic in areas where the licensor is the owner of core technology and has only 
granted the right to use it in a specific context of outsourcing R&D activities or toll manufacturing.132 
 
As a side note, while some companies have skirted the requirement in Article 27 with certain 
provisions in contracts, it is unclear if such contracts are legally valid under that article.133 These 
regulations create ambiguity for firms innovating with other entities, potentially raising the 
transaction costs and thus damping the efficiency and effectiveness with which patented products 
and processes underpinning innovation are ultimately developed in China.134  
 
Overly broad definitions of technology import and export  
 
The TIER is also unclear as to what technologies are covered under the category of “restricted” 
technology it sets forth. This makes it notably difficult for companies to assess if the 
imported/exported technology falls into the category, making international companies hesitate to 
import certain technology into China.135   
 
Moreover, it is unclear what technologies are covered under the category of “prohibited” 
technology in the TIER, as their listing in the measure is not exhaustive and there is in fact a non-
published list for “prohibited” products. This becomes particularly problematic when a product is 
claimed to be on this non-published list, and this is used as justification to not authorise transferring 
or selling of patents (whereas transferring or selling a patent to a foreigner is considered “export of 
technology”).136 This in turn complicates technology transfer and free usage of patents in a way that 
hampers innovation and building of patents. 
 
Further, the definition of “technology import and export” as defined in Article 2 of the TIER is overly 
broad, creating uncertainty that may indirectly jeopardise patent quality. It is unclear whether the 
definition employed in Article 2 covers experimental data at an early stage of research, and thus 
                                                        
131 See an English translation retrieved from http://tradeinservices.mofcom.gov.cn/en/local/2007-11-13/9733.shtml. Note 
1: English translations on the title of the TIER Measures differ. The Chinese name is 中华人民共和国技术进出口管理条. 
Note 2: These measures are distinct from the Measures of the Administration of Technology Import and Export Contracts 
Registration (技术进出口合同登记管理办法) issued on February 1st 2009 Decree No. 3 [2009] by MOFCOM, retrieved 
from http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI_EN/Laws/law_en_info.jsp?docid=102316, which replaced the Measures for the 
Administration of Technology Import and Export Contracts Registration, called Decree No. 17 (2001) by the Ministry of 
Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) (中华人民共和国技术进出口合同登记管理办法) issued on 
December 30th 2001 and effective on January 1st 2002, retrieved from 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/Display.aspx?lib=law&Cgid=38067. Note: These three different measures have incorrect 
translations on certain websites, and are sometimes incorrectly referenced in secondary sources.  
132 European Chamber’s 2012/2013 Annual Position Paper: IPR Working Group chapter (2012, forthcoming) 
133 2012, March 16- Consultations with Dr. Oliver Lutze in Shanghai 
134 Note: While one might speculate that these loopholes in the law were created to in-part mitigate the threat of litigation 
China’s ‘incremental innovators’ would otherwise face when following IIP guidance for assimilation, absorption, co-
innovation and/or re-innovation of foreign technologies, this is unclear.  
135 2012, May 7-  Consultations with Lin Xu in Shanghai 
136 2012, July 14- Consultations with Elliot Papageorgiou in Shanghai 
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what types of research needs approval from MOFCOM.137 As such, entities face uncertainty over 
how they need to report to the authorities on certain research activities which creates unnecessary 
transaction costs that somewhat hamper innovation activities and thus the efficiency and 
effectiveness with which such activities can lead to quality patents. If the restrictions turn-out to be 
applied to an overly wide range of activities, this would constitute an overly burdensome restriction, 
likely to some extent discouraging development of quality patents and related innovation. 
 
Overly strict requirements on liability 
 
As noted in the European Chamber’s forthcoming 2012/2013 IPR Working Group Position Paper, Article 
24 of the TIER sets overly burdensome requirements in mandating foreign technology licensors to 
bear liability for any accusation of infringement that may be brought against the importer in relation 
to the use of the licensed technology. In areas with patent thickets and where the licensed 
technology is still not fully developed, such obligation often creates an undue burden on the licensor 
and makes some technology transfers unacceptable if there is no flexibility to share risks.138 This in-
turn is a drag on patent quality and related innovation in these areas. 
 
Ⅲ.3.1.1.4 Uncertainty in inventor remuneration rules 
 
There is some uncertainty over legal liability for “reasonable” inventor remuneration in China, which 
might in the future hamper patent development. As illustrated in the European Chamber’s 
2011/2012 Position Paper, Chinese regulations require, in the absence of a specific agreement or 
relevant company policies, “the entity to which the patent is granted” to pay a minimum level of 
inventor remuneration. Research activities in China are performed by local Chinese companies under 
contract or by a foreign-invested R&D centre, and the right to apply for patents on solutions 
developed therein typically belongs to the company providing the investment or those foreign 
entities who invest in the R&D centre. The concern is thus that a foreign company might be 
unnecessarily liable for remuneration contracts even if the foreign company actually has no 
contractual relationship with an employee doing the inventing.139 To the extent that this ambiguity 
could prevent enterprises from signing contracts and investing in certain other parties’ R&D 
operations this is a drag on quality patent development and related innovation in China.  
 
Some measures have recently been proposed to shape the inventor remuneration system in China, 
although these do not appear to have fully addressed the aforementioned concerns. 
Provincial/municipal 12th Five Year on Plans on Intellectual Property, for example, Sichuan’s and 
Tianjin’s, recognise the need to improve the inventor remuneration system.140 As a publication of 
this study, SIPO was conducting “internal” consultations on the Regulations on the Remuneration for 
Inventor-Employee's Invention. 141  In general, regulations on inventor remuneration remain 
unsatisfactorily reformed throughout China. 
                                                        
137 2012, March 15- Consultations with Dr. Oliver Lutze in Shanghai. Article 2: “The technology import and export as 
referred to in these Regulations means acts of transferring technology from outside the territory of the People's Republic of 
China into the territory of the People's Republic of China or visa versa by way of trade, investment, or economic and 
technical cooperation. The acts mentioned in the preceding paragraph include assignment of the patent right, assignment 
of the patent application right, licensing for patent exploitation, assignment of technical secrets, technical services and 
transfer of technology by other means.” 
1382012/2013 Position Paper of the European Chamber’s IPR Working Group (forthcoming, 2012) 
139 European Chamber Position Paper 2011/2012 (2011), pp 43-44.  
140 Sichuan’s 12th Five Year Plan on Intellectual Property, Section 5, Part 3, Article 1: “…Improve the service 
invention compensation system.” Also see Tianjin’s 12th Five Year IP Plan, Section 4, Part 6, Article 1. 
141 A draft of this measure was provided exclusively to members of the Quality Brand Protection Committee (QBPC) for 
comment in August 2012. Consultations with two members of QBPC on August 10th 2012 suggest there are concerning 
provisions in the measure. Consultations with SIPO on August 9th 2012 suggest the measures will be released for public 
comment at the end of August 2012 or in September 2012. 
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Ⅲ.3.1.1.5 Ambiguities in the Measures on Compulsory Licensing 
 
There are a number of ambiguities in the Measures on Compulsory Licensing.142 For example, as 
listed in European Chamber IPR Working Group (Nov. 2011), the measures could at least be 
generally more clear about the requirements for granting a compulsory license; could remedy the 
fact government proposals for a compulsory license do not require evidential support; the 
patentee’s right to request a hearing is restricted, and there are no legal sanctions in cases where a 
licensee’s activities overextend the scope of the granted compulsory license; among other 
concerns. 143  Such uncertainties complicate business planning, which can hamper innovation; 
although in fairness, in practice these regulations do not seem to be applied in an extreme way as of 
yet. 
 
Ⅲ.3.1.2 Sub-section 3.2: Less patent-specific, but still patent-related, measures 
 
Introduction: This sub-section investigates how variety of significant Chinese policies and practices 
that while not necessarily patent-specific do relate closely to patent development and do not 
necessarily stimulate patent quality and related innovation in China.  
 
Ⅲ.3.1.2.1 General IIPs that encourage assimilation, absorption, and/or re-
innovation 
 
In addition to the IND-IP-specific issues discussed in the former sub-section, China’s overarching 
encouragement of “assimilation, absorption and re-innovation” as a fundamental approach to foreign 
firms’ patented products (and trade secrets, and knowledge otherwise covered under the Unfair 
Competition Law144) is in some ways concerning. Certain policies herein are concerning even though 
they do not explicitly set-forth the concepts of indigenous innovation contingent on IND IP or other 
IPR preconditions like those in the Trial Measures for the Administration of the Accreditation of National 
Indigenous Innovation Products (2006). Example measures used to explain the different dynamics of 
these IIPs are listed below: 
 
 Part 7, Chapter 27, para. 3 of China’s nationwide 12th Five Year Plan, which focuses on efforts 
to “enhance the original innovation, integrated innovation and the introduction of digestion 
and absorption of re-innovation…” 145  
 
 Section IV, Part 2 of the NPDS sets forth the following advice: “Encourage enterprises to 
acquire patent rights through innovation on the basis of digesting and absorbing imported 
                                                        
142 Draft most recently released for public comments in October 2011. Note 1: Recent procedures rules relating to 
compulsory licensing came into effect on May 1st 2012 via that Notice on Patent Compulsory Licensing issued on March 15th 
2012: http://www.sipo.gov.cn/zwgs/ling/201203/t20120319_654876.html (Note 1: link working when last checked on 
August 1st 2012). Note 2: Mention of compulsory licensing measures was left out of the Executive Summary of this study 
due to its relatively lesser importance compared with other issues mentioned therein. Note 3: In some ways, these 
measures are of course not intended to “promote” patents.  
143 See the European Chamber’s IPR Working Group Response to the Call for Comments on Measures for Compulsory 
Licensing, submitted to SIPO on November 13th 2011 (European Chamber IPR Working Group [Nov. 2011]). Measure 
retrieved from http://www.sipo.gov.cn/tz/gz/201110/P020111012508894173220.doc  
144 Unfair Competition Law of P.R China, issued on Sep. 2nd 1993, passed at the 3rd Meeting of 8th National People’s 
Congress Standing Committee, Zhuxi Ling (1993) No.10, retrieved from 
http://www.saic.gov.cn/fldyfbzdjz/zcfg/fv/200909/t20090928_71369.html  
145 Note: More generally, the term “indigenous innovation” is mentioned throughout the plan, and is reflected in the plan’s 
specific policies to build-up specific sectors.  
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patented technology.” Part IV, Section 4 of the NPDS mentions developing “self-relied” upon 
innovation and turning this into property rights. 
 
 The "Innovation Promotion Regulations of Guangdong Province (the “2012 Guangdong 
Ordinance”), promulgated by the Guangdong People’s Congress Standing Committee on 
November 30th 2011 and effective on March 1st 2012, “considering the dilemmas of overly 
emphasising importing, rather than absorbing and re-innovating,” supports “establishing 
and improving the re-innovation policy.”146  
 
 Part 2, Article 3 of Hunan’s Outline on Constructing an Innovative Province, effective on 
March 7th 2012 sets forth the following policy objectives: “…improve the capability of 
indigenous innovation as the core for enhancing original innovation, integrated innovation, 
the introduction of digestion and absorption in re-innovation, and collaboration for 
innovating...” 147 
 The Opinions of the Supreme People's Court on Giving Full Play to the Functional Role of 
Intellectual Property Trials in Advancing the Great Development and Prosperity of Socialist 
Culture and Promoting Independent and Coordinated Economic Development (Fa Fa [2011] 
No. 18), issued by the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) and effective on December 16th 2011 
(hereafter the “December 16th 2011 SPC Opinion”) contains the following: 
Part 1, para. 1: “The Central Economic Work Conference requires that we…keep 
strengthening capabilities of integrated innovation, introduction, digestion, 
absorption and re-innovation; should comply with the innovation drive and 
strengthen intellectual property protection; should cultivate and develop strategic 
emerging industries…”  
 
Part 3, para. 12: “…focus on improving China's original innovation capacity, 
integrated innovation capacity and capabilities of introduction, digestion, absorption 
and re-innovation as important goals…intensify the protection of key core 
technologies, basic and frontier fields, and emerging strategic industries, promote 
technical breakthrough and technical innovation…”148  
 
Approaches to incremental innovation in an economic context 
 
It is first important to recognise that while the simple mention of the terms “assimilation,” 
“absorption” and “re-innovation” in policies (hereafter, for simplicity, collectively referred to as 
incremental innovation policies) raise eyebrows in IPR circles, in fact such an approach to innovation 
has been promoted by a variety of economists for over 20 years. As noted in the Introduction to this 
study, it is indisputable that incremental innovation, which is based upon exploitation of existing 
solutions, has solid value. 
 
Within the concept of incremental innovation, one could theoretically distinguish “import-based” 
incremental innovation from “domestic-based incremental innovation, whereas “import-based” 
incremental innovation focuses specially on imported foreign technologies rather than on 
                                                        
146 For a summary of the policymaking process for the measure see Guangdong Provincial People’s Congress News 
Conference on Promulgation and Implementation of Provincial Independent Innovation Regulation (2010, February 29). 
Retrieved from http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/dfrd/guangdong/2012-02/29/content_1693676.htm. Regarding text 
of the measure, see Chapter 2, Article 6, Article 9(1), and Article 10. 
147 Retrieved from http://www.hunan.gov.cn/zwgk/hndt/zwdt/201203/t20120308_457488.htm 
148 December 16th 2011 SPC Opinion retrieved from Westlaw China: http://www.westlawchina.com/index_en.html While 
full of several examples of disconcerting rhetoric, it is worth noting that the December16th 2011 SPC Opinion also contains 
some provisions that may indirectly have a positive impact on innovation and the IP framework in China. 
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domestically-created products. An emphasis on incremental innovation based on outside solutions 
appears to have started with Cohen (1989) and Levinthal (1990), who promoted “absorption,”  an 
awareness of new information and enhanced ability to assimilate and utilise existing information 
and ideas developed elsewhere to improve one’s own innovation capacity.149 Other sources find that 
countries that are able to develop a sufficient absorption capacity are more likely to maximise usage 
of foreign technologies and may possibly develop their own new technologies.150  
 
Some sources argue that certain innovation approaches related to incremental innovation have 
value. Some have suggested that the shānzhài (山寨) culture in China, a term referring to the 
imitation of goods (often electronics in particular), sometimes with small “improvements” on the 
original product, is in fact an example of incremental innovation that can be a stepping stone 
towards more substantive innovation. 151 As another approach, sources describe “reverse 
engineering” as a legitimate building block for innovation,152 which while not tantamount to 
incremental innovation can be based upon incremental innovation.  
 
There are studies that discuss how IPR protection specifically fits into this system of incremental 
innovation. As one example, also cited in the Introduction of this study, Lee and Park (2006) 
explicitly find that the utility model patent system has a positive influence on developing countries’ 
innovation and growth as it protects incremental inventions and is more conducive to innovation, 
diffusion of technology, and economic growth in those countries given the make-up of their 
economic systems.  
 
Why these IIPs have the propensity to hurt patent quality and related innovation in China 
 
While it is important for the government to carefully consider the aforementioned economic logic 
and find an appropriate balance in IIPs to stimulate innovation and related patent quality, the 
current IIP framework likely needs reform. The reasons for this are discussed below. 
 
Choosing between current policy thinking when outside-the-box thinking is needed instead 
 
While recognised by economists as important stepping-stones for developing countries to better 
innovate, it is also clear that an overly heavy focus on incremental innovation policies is negative. At 
worst, an overly heavy focus on import-based incremental innovation policies makes enterprises so 
reliant on foreign technologies that they become unable to “independently” innovate and develop 
highest-quality patents in the short-, mid-, and long-term. And this assertion is not clearly challenged 
by the aforementioned economic literature: in fact certain academic sources, for example Hu and 
                                                        
149 Cohen, W. M., & Levinthal, D. A. (1989). Innovation and learning: The two faces of R&D. The Economic Journal, 99, 569-
596; and Cohen, W. M., & Levinthal, D. A. (1990). Absorptive capacity: A new perspective on learning and innovation. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, Special Issue: Technology, Organizations, and Innovation, 35(1), 128-152. 
150 Nelson, R.R. (Ed.) (1993). National innovation systems: A comparative analysis. New York: Oxford University Press;  
 Kim, L. (1997). Imitation to Innovation: The Dynamics of Korea's Technological Learning. Boston: Harvard Business Press; 
Yu, T.F.-L. (1998) Adaptive Entrepreneurship and the Economic Development of Hong Kong. World Development, 26(5), 
897-911; World Bank (2001). Intellectual property: Balancing incentives with 
competitive access. Global Economic Prospects. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 129-150; and Lall, S. (2003). Indicators of 
the Relative Importance of IPRs in Developing Countries. Research Policy, 32(9), 1657-1680. 
151 Thos phenomenon has received an increasing amount of media attention recently, and its merits are subject of some 
debate in both China and abroad. 
152 For example, where products developed via reverse innovation in developing countries are sold in developed countries 
at low prices, creating new markets and uses for the solutions. See: Govindarajan, V., & Trimble, C. (2012). Reverse 
innovation: Create far from home, win everywhere. USA: Harvard Business Press. 
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Matthews (2008), caution against countries like China getting caught in the trap of being a perpetual 
imitator rather than evolving to sustain “genuine” innovation.153  
 
Also, an overly heavily focus on incremental innovation policies, even if they are focused increasingly 
or more so on domestic-based incremental innovation than import-based incremental innovation, 
can be negative as they retard healthy development that may have otherwise happened with a more 
appropriate balance of policies also encouraging breakthrough innovation. To be sure, this latter 
assertion need not conflict nor should in any way be negated by recent suggestions in Breznitz and 
Murphee (2011), that China should not overemphaise policies to build-up “novel-product 
innovation” (roughly tantamount to the concept of breakthrough innovation used in this study) and 
that China can support its economy in the next decade or so (mid-term) through “secondary 
innovation” (roughly tantamount to the concept of incremental innovation used in this study).154 
This said, it is admittedly difficult to decide at exactly which point this overemphasis significantly 
threatens mid- to- long-term innovation, patent quality, and resulting economic development. 
 
In some instances, overemphasis on currently conceived IIPs can indoctrinate the policymaking 
system in a way that prevents creation and implementation of other domestic Chinese innovation 
polices that would be more helpful for building up innovation and quality patents realised in the 
longer-term. By way of illustration, it is clear that some provinces, as illustrated in the 
abovementioned 2012 Guangdong Ordinance, are concerned about moving too quickly towards an 
approach to innovation based too heavily on importing technologies and want to instead improve 
their approach to incremental innovation. As such, it appears that simply recycling existing 
approaches to innovation will limit Guangdong-based companies’ ability to develop domestically, let 
alone internationally. While Guangdong is taking action to revise its own problems in this regard, it is 
worth further investigating if other provincial/municipal authorities across China are ‘trapped’ in 
deciding among the IIP approaches passed down for further implementation by national authorities 
or previous provincial authorities to date, whereas they would be better served to think outside this 
policy box in revising their individual innovation policies.  
 
In summary, in the opinion of this study, while some may debate if China is focusing too much on 
breakthrough-innovation policies, it is perhaps more exigent to acknowledge that breakthrough 
innovations are indeed important for the Chinese economy (even if more so in the medium- to long-
term) and scrutinise areas where current IIPs should evolve to better foster both incremental and 
breakthrough innovation. None of this should be mistaken as saying the government should 
necessarily further use more of the types of IIPs currently promulgated to stimulate incremental 
innovation instead of breakthrough innovation or vice versa; rather, it is to say that there are 
instances where either or both types of IIPs as currently understood should be revised and better 
implemented on-the-ground to more effectively meet the ultimate goal they both share: building 
China into a powerhouse with solid innovation in the future.   
 
                                                        
153 Hu, M. C., & Mathews, J. A. (2008). China's national innovative capacity. Research Policy, Volume. 37, 1465-79. 
Retrieved from http://nthur.lib.nthu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/61675 
154 Breznitz, D., & Murphree, M. (2011, May). Run of the red queen: Government, innovation, globalization, and economic 
growth in China. New Haven: Yale University Press. Also see the following quote: “Our fear is that by focusing too much on 
producing novel-product innovation, the central government will harm a key pillar of China’s sustained economic growth – 
second-generation production and process innovation. In time, China will come to master novel-product innovation, 
especially in new industries for which the competitive and standards environment has not yet been defined. But instead of 
forcing itself to copy foreign models developed within different economic systems, China should follow its own development 
path. There is no urgency for China to master novel-product innovation, especially since the interdependencies fostered by 
the fragmented global production system make concerns over national technological security largely irrelevant. China’s 
position at the heart of global production means that the Run of the Red Queen model of development is secure for the next 
decade or so.” (Source: Breznitz, D., & Murphree, M. (2011, September). Innovation in emerging economies: China’s run of 
the red queen. World Financial Review. Retrieved from http://www.worldfinancialreview.com/?p=848) 
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Potentially enabling infringement 
 
Even if unintentional, it is not difficult to envisage a situation where Chinese IIPs built on the 
principles of “assimilation,” “absorption,” and “re-innovation” can encourage infringement given the 
still underdeveloped respect for IPR in China. Given many consumers, businesspeople, and even 
some government representatives155 in China still have a generally underdeveloped respect and 
knowledge of the importance of IPR, IIPs that tout “assimilation,” “absorption” and “re-innovation” 
as fundamental methods of innovation and patent development may very well be used to justify, or 
actually interpreted to encourage, development of products, services and processes in a way that 
nearly outright encourages infringement.  
 
Such policies may to some extent unintentionally increase administrative actions, arbitration, and/or 
litigation, tying up resources of the state that otherwise should have been preserved for more 
‘appropriate’ cases. More appropriate cases herein are those that would arise in a more ‘neutral’ 
regulatory environment, and/or channeled into more appropriately strengthening the IPR system 
and otherwise fostering quality patents in China.  
 
Moreover, it is concerning that such policies are explicitly at the heart of judicial approaches to 
future patent cases as is reflected in the December 16th 2011 SPC Opinion (see Part 1. para 3, and 
Part 3 para. 12 as quoted above), which deserves clarification to ensure it does not discriminatorily 
favour right-holders in infringement cases. For one, it deserves clarification as to if the opinion might 
be used in certain circumstances to favor an alleged infringer if he/she was acting in the name of 
such IIPs. It also deserves clarification if the opinion could possibly create a situation where 
infringement cases involving products, services, and processes in strategic emerging industries 
specifically are dealt with different than other cases, creating a discriminatory adjudication 
environment.  
 
Amidst this, it is important to note that the school of economic thought supporting incremental 
innovation policies (whether import-based or domestic-based) first mentioned in this section need 
not be connected with a logic supporting IPR infringement, whereas other strong academic studies 
suggest China need not rely on full-fledged imitation to build-up its innovative capacity. For example, 
Maskus, Dougherty, and Mertha (2005) finds inward technology transfer is the main source of new 
information creating technological advancement and structural transformation in China, and thus 
imitation of IPR, including patents, does not necessarily need to be a phase of China’s industrial 
development.156  This touches upon an important point that may be easily lost in the translation of 
IIPs into action in China. 
 
Ⅲ .3.1.2.2 Megaprojects vs. more effective models of innovation-building 
projects 
 
A notable concern in China’s innovation drive is that its massive funding/commissioning of 
“megaprojects,” large-scale expensive projects run by only a few entities, is not the most effective 
way to foster key innovations and likely in-turn hinders the quality of patents that could have been 
produced if the projects were more effectively commissioned. As McGregor (2010) explains, these 
megaprojects, for example those commissioned by MoST, are meant to build up industries in China, 
including via creating innovation infrastructure. McGregor (2010), citing the opinions of a wide range 
                                                        
155 For example, although not due to shortage of recent efforts from the government to change this trend, a number of 
government offices throughout the country still use IP-infringing products. 
156 Maskus, K. E., Dougherty, S. M., & Mertha, A. (2005). Intellectual property rights and economic development in China. In 
Fink, C., & Maskus, K. E. (Eds.) Intellectual property and development: Lessons from recent economic research (pp. 295-332). 
New York: Co-publication of World Bank, Washington D.C. and Oxford University Press. Retrieved from 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/Pubs/IPRs-book.pdf 
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of scientists, finds the weakness of such megaprojects is that innovation best comes from individuals 
or comparatively smaller teams working on particular projects that they are passionate about and 
for which their qualifications, proposals, and work have undergone solid examination.157 These flaws 
in the megaproject approach as an optimal strategy to produce higher quality patents in the short-, 
mid-, and long-term are compounded with those mentioned in the earlier section in this Chapter on 
IPR ownership prerequisites for participation in such programs.  
 
As mentioned previously, it is worth noting that some recent measures appear to at least realise 
MoST’s approach to S&T projects needs reforming, although it does not appear that they 
fundamentally challenge the size composition of S&T megaprojects. With the exception of Part 6, 
measure 61, other provisions from the 2012 National IP Strategy, i.e. Part 3, measure 17; and Part 6, 
measures 58, 60, and 64 all continue to use the keywords “major projects” in a way that may 
indicate a lack of reform to the megaproject approach to MoST projects but rather only more 
peripheral reforms (see the “Introduction” section of the Annex for translated text of these 
provisions). Additionally, Part 3, Section 4, Article 1 of the SC Notice on IPR in Strategic Industries 
mentions initiatives for IP strategy for building IPR in “major technology projects.”158  
 
Ⅲ.3.1.2.3 Financial incentives not directly linked to IP, but still closely impacting 
patent quality 
 
Ⅲ.3.1.2.3.1 “National champion” logic embedded in EIDF subsidies 
 
Further to the above discussion on megaprojects, the structure of some funding in the Electronics and IT 
Development Fund (EIDF) raises some concerns in relation to patent quality given its focus on large 
companies. The EIDF was first developed in 1986 and is believed by some to have helped China 
generate a significant number of patents. For example, Stewart (2007) notes sources consider the 
EIDF helped generate 2,456 patents. The same source notes that as of 2004, the fund had invested 
more than 3.9 billion RMB in 1,859 projects via direct finance and other forms of support to the 
electronics and information technology industries.159 It is notable that some EIDF funds seem to be 
focused on large companies (dà gōngsī, 大公司); for example, the Opinion on Accelerating the Large 
Company Strategy in the Electronics and Information Industry, issued by MIIT on January 28th 2005, 
and which is still effective, states: 
 
Section 5, Article 1.2: “Provide support to the leading large companies. Within government 
procurement, for key projects (such as new internet, 3G, digital TV, software, automobile 
electronic product projects, and so on),[those in] the EIDF, the scientific fund… preference will 
given to these large companies.” 160   
 
While is it standard for governments to establish minimum threshold requirements in government 
procurement, it is different to stipulate that “large companies” full-stop be given preference in 
government procurement tendering. As such, it is worth considering that even if the EIDF has 
                                                        
157 McGregor (2010). (Note: Although on the other hand, one may argue the approach is in fact effective for building up 
certain large scale infrastructure which is best commissioned to a limited amount of people so it relatively seamlessly links 
up. Also there may be additional near-term employment-based rationale behind such large scale projects.) 
158 Part 3, Article 2: “We shall promote the planning and implementation of intellectual property rights strategy of major 
technology projects with a focus on industry development…” 
159  Stewart, T. (2007). China’s industrial subsidies study: High technology. Trade Lawyers Advisory Group. Retrieved from 
http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2008/TLAG%20Study%20-
%20China%27s%20Industrial%20Subsidies%20High%20Technology.pdf 
160 Retrieved on March 20, 2012 from http://www.chinabaike.com/law/zy/bw/gw/xcb/1355307_2.html Note: Translation 
from the European Chamber thus is unofficial.  
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contributed to a significant number of patents in China, if administered in a way that better fosters 
competition amongst all types of qualified companies it may better contribute to raising patent 
quality and related innovation in China. Herein, one area to investigate is the evidence behind 
government statements touting the achievements of the “Large Company Strategy,” inclusive of the 
aforementioned measure and six specific companies it has been used to support.161 
 
In an increasingly competitive market, sources argue that the “national champion” models once 
used by nations like South Korea no longer are as relevant for the Chinese government to follow.162 
As such, pushing development of these Chinese behemoths is not only an antiquated approach to 
building innovation and economic competitiveness but may result in spending that could have been 
better channeled through different more merit-than-size-based attempts at building innovative and 
competitive enterprises.  
Ⅲ.3.1.2.3.2 Other subsidy funds  
 
A variety of requirements in subsidies not specifically discussed thus far, while less directly related to 
IND-IP-based requirements, may also create somewhat of a drag on balanced innovation and patent 
quality given their blatantly discriminatory/WTO-inconsistent nature. In particular, there is evidence 
of a variety of subsidies offered on the basis of export performance, import substitution, and to 
domestic companies in specifically defined industries.163  
 
Ⅲ.3.1.2.4 Lack of transparency in policy formulation and implementation 
 
An often repeated issue, the lack of transparency and uncertainty as to what rules are being drafted 
and implemented; limited time to comment on these measures before enactment; and lack of 
translated measures in one or more of the official languages of the WTO also pushes companies to 
be more reluctant to innovate and contribute to the building of highest-quality patents and related 
innovation in China. This is a longstanding problem and is not fully aligned with China’s WTO 
commitments on transparency.164  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
161 Note: Interestingly, MIIT’s Report for the 60th Anniversary of the PRC, issued by MIIT on September 18th 2009 implies the 
Opinion on Accelerating the Large Company Strategy in the Electronics and Information Industry has had a positive impact. 
Specifically, Part II, Section 2, Para 4 of the measure finds: “The ‘Large Company Strategy’ has remarkable achievement. 
The ‘Large Company Strategy’ was developed in 1993 when the new MIIT was established. SVA, Changhong, Caihong, 
Panda, Lenovo and Hualu have been selected as 6 key companies to support. During this time, MIIT issued the 
‘Implementation Measures on Large Company Strategy in Electronics and Information Industry.’ MIIT’s ‘Opinion on 
Accelerating the Large Company Strategy in the Electronics and Information Industry’ has accelerated this strategy. Industry 
integration is rising and production is concentrated in large companies and groups. Leading companies’ image and brands 
are becoming prominent.” (Measure retrieved on August 15, 2012 from 
http://www.miit.gov.cn/n11293472/n11293877/n12511031/n12511106/12693827.html)  
162 Breznitz and Murphee (2011, September) 
163 Prud’homme (forthcoming 2012)  
164 See GATT Article X, GATS Article III, TRIPS Agreement Article 63, as well as China’s WTO plus commitments in its Report 
of the Working Paper on the Accession of China to the WTO (e.g. Part VII Other Issues, Section 3. Transparency, Article 334: 
“The representative of China confirmed that China would make available to WTO Members translations into one or more of 
the official languages of the WTO all laws, regulations and other measures pertaining to or affecting trade in goods, 
services, TRIPS or the control of forex, and to the maximum extent possible would make these laws, regulations and other 
measures available before they were implemented or enforced, but in no case later than 90 days after they were 
implemented or enforced.  The Working Party took note of these commitments.”). Note: lack of transparency is not 
necessarily intentionally meant to try and “promote” patents and innovation, although sometimes in fact is, and either way 
can discourage quality patents and innovation.  
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Ⅲ.3.1.2.5 Less than optimal coordination of industry park initiatives 
 
It is arguably difficult for many industrial parks in China to best build innovation and produce 
highest-quality patents given their less than optimal coordination with each other (this situation also 
more generally applies to different economic-related zones in China at large, not only industrial 
parks within these zones). Provincial/municipal and local governments often afford industrial parks 
within their purview a range of tax incentives outside R&D Centre-specific incentives to attract 
certain companies and industries, for example, among others, refunds on VAT, BT, and EIT paid by 
companies’ value-added operations which while not exclusively tied to R&D operations could be in 
part used to encourage innovation and in turn quality patent filings. A variety of industrial parks 
within provinces seek to attract certain types of industries using the aforementioned financial tools 
as well as certain outreach strategies, but in many cases go about this largely unilaterally whereas 
several industry parks within one province/municipality could be seeking to boost the exact same 
niche industry.  
 
This situation hampers patent quality and related innovation in China that likely could otherwise be 
realised through improved coordination among industrial parks. On one hand, some might argue 
that industry parks need not coordinate among themselves to best stimulate innovation and 
resulting patents as the forces of competition would naturally lead to efficiency optimisation therein. 
On the other hand, this viewpoint does not fully consider the fact that China does not operate in the 
hands-off fashion that would perhaps in another country allow this approach to work, whereas 
China’s provincial and local governments are bound by a centrally-promulgated innovation policy 
that they need to implement, albeit in many cases with decent room for discretion in 
implementation. For example, provincial and local governments are tasked with building up strategic 
emerging industries as outlined in China’s national 12th Five Year Plan (see the Introduction section 
for a full listing of these industries); however, the fact remains that not every industry park within a 
province/municipality is capable, nor is it necessarily economically wise, for them to all attempt to 
build these particular industries. And there is questionable economic utility in, for example, multiple 
industry parks in a province trying to build their own biomedical engineering equipment industry 
when they could likely better stimulate other competitive industries. As such, one could argue that if 
local and/or provincial/municipal governments in partnership with the industrial parks’ management 
were to provide improved management of what an industrial park, given its strengths as measured 
by an assessment, should focus on as distinct from another industrial park, this may ultimately lead 
to more mid- to long-term innovation efficiency gains. However, without this improved coordination, 
the current situation creates inefficiencies and ineffectiveness that likely somewhat hamper 
development of quality patents and related innovation in China.  
 
Ⅲ.3.1.2.6 A range of other policies 
 
A variety of other policies are likely in some ways inhibiting the development of the highest-quality 
patents in particular and related innovation in China. A list of policies not discussed in this study that 
may more indirectly inhibit efficient and effective innovation and development of quality patents 
can be found in the European Chamber’s Annual Position Paper, among other sources.165 
                                                        
165 For example, see Atkinson (2012). Note: one important issue herein is China’s increasing industry consolidation of the 
market for rare earth elements, which are key inputs in highly innovative and patented technologies, which in some 
circumstances has enabled monopolies to not honor contracts of supply with private businesses, which in-turn may inhibit 
important R&D efforts already in China (Source: 2012, January 19 – Consultations with a member of the European 
Chamber) 
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Ⅲ.3.2 Summary:  
 
China has a wide-range of patent-specific and other patent-related policies in-place, many of which 
are at least partially meant to encourage patents, although some of these policies in effect can 
actually discourage quality patents, and highest-quality patents in particular, and related innovation. 
The most concerning of these policies are explored in this Chapter. 
 
 
Ⅲ.3.3 Recommendations 
 
Ⅲ.3.3.1 Core recommendations 
 
Sub-section 3.1  
 
1. Recommendation: Revise the award criteria in the patent filing subsidy application process, and 
improve oversight of the patent filing subsidy program. This system should be codified at the 
central-level and mandatorily executed in all provinces/municipalities although with flexibility for 
these provincial/municipal levels to cater the system to their own needs. 
 
8.1 A well-equipped appraisal committee should be set-up to oversee the patent filing 
subsidy awarding process. The unit should be staffed with technical and legal experts 
who will provide a formal evaluation of a patent application. The appraisal committee 
may set forth a standard ranking for these applications. The unit might also be staffed 
with other experts that would optimally help evaluate how much subsidy monies to 
provide an applicant based on the aforementioned evaluation. Only those patent 
applications approved by the appraisal committee would be provided subsidies (see 
recommendation below for further details).  
 
Patent filing subsidies should be focused more so if not completely on invention 
patents as opposed to utility models or design patents, and therein subsidies might 
be geared more so on patentees whose solution has particularly high inventiveness.  
 
A mechanism should be established to ensure an appropriate awarding of patent 
fees after the subsidy appraisal committee vets prospective patents for 
subsidisation. Some governments are already only granting subsidies to patents that 
are granted, although this does not appear to be the case across all of China. In 
order to prevent unintended stifling of innovation in SMEs with little money to 
spend up-front on the patenting process, subsidies should not necessarily be only 
provided after the patent is granted, but could be structured in a way that they are 
appropriately provided to patents that are ultimately granted. Any one, or a 
combination of, the examples described hereafter are mechanisms that could be 
used to ensure that subsidies are provided to patents that are granted while also not 
overly discouraging applicants from applying for subsidies: 
 
Method A1: (1) Applicants can apply for patent filing subsidies for a set of patent-
related fees (hereafter the “Patent Fee”). Initially, the Patent Fee is waived. (2) If the 
patent is granted by SIPO, the applicant then pays a non-refundable fee to then have 
the application sent to an appraisal committee for consideration for subsidisation of 
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the Patent Fee. If the patent is approved by this committee, the applicant need not 
pay any of the Patent Fee (outside the aforementioned non-refundable appraisal 
committee review fee). However, if the patent is rejected by the appraisal 
committee, the applicant must pay back the Patent Fee at a to-be-determined, non-
subsidised, interest rate under a defined payment plan.  
 
Method A2: (1) An applicant should pay for a patent Search Report from an external 
agent accredited by SIPO, and SIPO should regulate the fees such agents can charge 
for these reports. (2) The applicant then applies to the appraisal committee directly, 
paying a non-refundable fee and enclosing the aforementioned completed Search 
Report in their application, for their Patent Fees to be subsidised. (3) (a) If approved 
by the appraisal committee, the applicants’ Patent Fee (outside the aforementioned 
non-refundable appraisal committee review fee) is waived, and the cost of the initial 
Search Report is reimbursed. The applicant’s application is then automatically 
submitted to SIPO examiners for a patentability review. The aforementioned waiving 
of the Patent Fee and reimbursement of the Search Report remains as such 
regardless of whether the patent is subsequently granted by the examiners. (b) 
However, if rejected by the appraisal committee, the applicant is only reimbursed 
for the Search Report fee, or a portion of the Patent Fee is deducted when the 
applicant applies (if they choose to apply) for SIPO examination of the application, 
and the applicant must pay the rest of the Patent Fee. 
 
Method B: (1) An applicant should pay for a patent Search Report from an external 
agent accredited by SIPO, and SIPO should regulate the fees such agents can charge 
for these reports. (2) The applicant then applies to the appraisal committee directly 
(for free) for their patent to be subsidised, enclosing the aforementioned completed 
Search Report in their application. (3) (a) If approved by the appraisal committee, 
the applicant is issued a formal certificate saying they do not have to pay X% portion 
(e.g. 75%) of the Patent Fee, including the Search Report fee. In the instance that a 
patent that is approved for subsidisation by the patent subsidy appraisal committee 
is not actually granted by SIPO examiners, several steps should be undertaken. First, 
the application should undergo automatic re-examination with the PRB. Pending the 
reasons for not granting the patent in the first review (and thus the need for re-
examination), the re-examination fees should be covered by the appraisal 
committee rather than the applicant. If deemed fully valid after re-examination, the 
appraisal committee could pay the applicant an additional amount towards the 
Patent Fee (e.g. the remaining 25% of the Patent Fee, meaning 100% of the Patent 
Fee and the Search Report fee would have been ultimately subsidised by the 
government). If the patent is partially invalidated or fully invalidated by the PRB, 
pending the reasons, the appraisal committee could still pay the applicant the 
aforementioned additional amount of the Patent Fee, or instead require the 
applicant pay this amount. (b) If rejected by the appraisal committee, the applicant 
would only be reimbursed for the Search Report, or instead a portion of the Patent 
Fee would be deducted when the applicant applies (if they choose to apply) for the 
first SIPO examination of the patent. The applicant must pay the rest of the Patent 
Fee. 
 
Note: To ensure integrity in the review process within Method A1, A2 and B, it might 
be prudent not to indicate on the patent application subject to the first SIPO 
examination whether the application is involved in the patent filing subsidy program. 
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In the instance a set of roughly ‘equally inventive’ patent applications are vying for 
limited subsidy funds, one might consider a ‘tie-breaker’ criteria for deciding how 
to grant patent subsidies. For example, the government might support smaller and 
less well-funded entities applying; however, a thorough policy assessment should be 
run before any such approach is adopted as a matter of policy. Additionally, one 
might not only consider the quality of the patent reviewed, but the performance of 
the patent applicant in terms of serving as a losing defendant in certain IPR 
infringement cases, among other criteria.  
 
8.2 A supervision committee should be set-up to oversee an opposition mechanism 
and post-granting monitoring and evaluation. This committee would solicit written 
opposition comments from third-parties, via a notice in a gazette, on if a patent selected 
for subsidisation should in fact be subsidised or if an already subsidised patent should 
remain subsidised. Also, a database with subsidy-related information should be 
maintained. Through review of this database and the opposition process, patents to 
receive or already receiving subsidies should be scrutinised, particularly in the instance a 
patent application procedure is deliberately terminated by the applicant. 
 
Several components should be added to the mechanism to oppose and revoke 
subsidies. First, the grounds for opposing subsidation should be clearly stipulated 
before this process is initiated. Second, to prevent abuse of the opposition process, 
if opponents abuse the opposition process with unreasonable oppositions, they will 
be warned/receive a certain type of warning(s) and other punitive action may be 
taken. Third, a formal and well-functioning mechanism should collate relevant 
information from State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC), GAC, SIPO, 
the Ministry of Public Security (MPS)/police, procurators, and other IPR 
administrative enforcement bodies; arbitration committees; and the judiciary; as 
well as rights holders and other parties relevant for challenging a particular patent’s/ 
applicant’s access to subsidisation.  
 
In a proven instance of bad faith filings, filing subsidies should be repaid with 
interest and additional fines imposed. In this instance, the government should (1) 
ensure any subsidies given for patent filing and development are repaid with 
interest, and (2) additional fines that become increasingly steep per number of 
invalidations by a single filer should be considered for repeat offenders (for example, 
those who file more than X bad faith filings are fined between X-Y RMB, those who 
file more than Y are fined between Y-Z RMB, and so on). Monies must be repaid to 
the granting institution based on a repayment system developed by SIPO. As 
relevant, and pending the Method used as suggested above, the appraisal 
committee member who approved such a patent for subsidies should be penalised 
in his/her performance review. 
 
2. Recommendation: IIPs premised exclusively on IND-IP-based requirements (as opposed to also 
on IP licensing from abroad) that are linked to subsidies and other financial incentives should 
be clearly nullified. This should be required in the absence of publically available, rigorous 
analyses (including empirical analyses) that support the idea that IND IP requirements as 
currently conceived and linked to financial incentives best enable economic, environmental, 
and/or social progress in China in a way a less discriminatory policy approach cannot. To be sure, 
“best” herein should be based on solid scientific, economic, and legal rationales.  
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9.1 If any measure, for example an IIP rule mentioned within this study, has in fact 
been invalidated/made null but is still published online, either remove the regulations 
from online government sources or require clear indication on the actual text of the 
measures posted that they have been nullified. 
 
3. Recommendation: Amend the requirements in current IND-IP-based IIPs to instead include 
different, arguably better, determinants of the success of an enterprise in building quality 
patents. For example, criteria could be set in terms of high and productive investments in R&D 
(e.g. measured via R&D returns), invention patents in-force for longer than 6 years or an 
otherwise appropriate period of time, products or services with high value-added and 
commercial value, among other criteria. 
 
4. Recommendation: Policy advice should focus less on certain current patent-based incentives 
reviewed in this study and encourage more sustainable incentives to boost innovation and 
competiveness.  
 
11.1 Set forth policy advice that mandates all incentives specifically for patent 
development set out by provincial/municipal and local levels – whether this support is 
for patent filings, transformation of patents, monetisation of patents, or other forms 
of patent development – first meet certain verified patent quality thresholds.  
 
11.2 Consider requiring an assessment on the social impact of certain incentives. 
 
11.3 Policy advice should be revised as necessary to better encourage employers to 
offer incentives to their employees to innovate not just for the sake of producing 
patents but to also optimally contribute to the overall competitiveness of the 
company, research institute, or university.  
 
5. Recommendation: Consider elevating the role of MOFCOM in innovation policymaking to be 
more on par with MoST and NDRC. In addition to other mechanisms, more formal 
development of the responsibilities within the Inter-Ministerial Joint Conference could 
be used as one mechanism to monitor this power-sharing.  
 
6. Recommendation: Include foreign and Chinese business and industry associations and other 
experts in the formulation process for specific regulations on IP management in line with the 
Provisional Regulations on Intellectual Property Management of the Major National Scientific 
and Technological Projects (as mentioned in Part 6, measure 60 of the 2012 National IP 
Strategy Plan), and other related measures. 
 
7. Recommendation: Conduct an audit or series of audits, led by China’s National Audit Office, on 
the workings of all major innovation-related funding programs and other key innovation 
policies in China. This report could form the basis for improving related programs and policies 
as discussed among SIPO, MoST, and other relevant bodies involved in patent and innovation 
strategy and implementation. 
 
8. Recommendation: Relevant government bodies should keep transparent websites that track 
government funding according to a variety of specific reporting criteria.  
 
15.1 Consider consolidating information on all major innovation-specific funding 
programs in a concise manner in English or another WTO language on relevant 
government websites. The EC-funded project China Access4EU has already compiled 
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this for many government funding programs at a helpful level of detail, although some 
major programs appear not to be covered, and the full details of subsidies at provincial 
and local levels are not clearly outlined. 
 
15.2 Relevant government bodies should keep transparent websites which provide a 
listing of those entities actually awarded government funding, in addition to other key 
details. Specifically, the site should present the disaggregated scores for project awards 
on a set of clearly listed criteria for qualifying for such funding; in addition to details of 
projects they are working on; and any other relevant information necessary to ensure 
transparency and foster competition. 
 
9. Recommendation: IND IP IIPs linked to subsidies and any other financial preferences (inclusive 
of those based on WTO inconsistent provisions) should be nullified. Financial incentives should 
be revised to be less discriminatory and better promote innovation and patent quality.  
 
16.1 All WTO inconsistent subsidies with IND IP provisions should be clearly nullified 
and voided. And all relevant subsidies should be reported to the WTO’s Committee on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Duties.  
 
16.2 All subsidies and other financial support that are not necessarily WTO 
inconsistent but are not awarded equitably to qualified enterprises, including support 
that is solely innovation-focused, should be opened up equally de facto to both foreign 
and domestic entities. 
 
16.3 As a replacement for IND IP criteria in export subsidies, perfect an outreach 
program where export-intensive Chinese enterprises are better informed of the need 
to register their IPR abroad, and are better provided guidance on how to do so. This 
might, for example, be modelled off of the China IPR SME Helpdesk, a project funded by 
the EC for EU companies operating or looking to operate in China, and which the 
European Chamber has been implementing for several years now.  
 
10. Recommendation: Enact specific revisions to the criteria for HNTE status. 
 
17.1 Revise Part V, Section I, para. 1 of the Application for Recognition of Hi-tech 
Enterprises and reform the actual approval process to notably raise the threshold for 
the quality of utility models accepted as meeting the IPR requirements for HNTE status.  
 
17.2 Consider adding the preconditions for receiving HNTE status that enterprises are 
not frequently a losing defendant in patent infringement cases, nor are repeatedly 
convicted of bad faith filings. These conditions might also be binding while receiving 
recognition of HNTE status, whereas in certain extreme cases HNTE status might be 
revoked if the conditions are not met.  
 
17.3 Revise Part V, Section I, para. 4 of the Working Guidance on the Recognition of Hi-
tech Enterprises to state that qualifying enterprises need not have IP owned in China, 
but the China affiliate can qualify for HNTE status if possessing appropriate R&D 
personnel and funding so that it can reasonably be expected that these resources will 
lead to creation of quality patented solutions in the future.  
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17.4 Consider revising current Chinese law to, subject to reasonable conditions, state 
that an HNTE shall own the IP from its research in China but may freely license it to 
foreign-affiliated companies or third parties without effect on its HNTE status.   
 
17.5 Fully contingent on the above recommendations first being implemented, then 
consider phasing out the option to use utility models to qualify for HNTE status, 
instead exclusively requiring filings of quality invention patents. The Application for 
Recognition of Hi-tech Enterprises could be revised accordingly.  
 
 
11. Recommendation: Open at least partially more of China’s government-sponsored S&T funding 
programs to foreign entities, and revise IPR restrictions therein to allow project partners to 
own the knowledge produced from the projects, and beyond this simply require that the 
project partners reach an agreement among themselves on IPR ownership and licensing and 
explicitly allow IPR ownership transfer and licensing. This should include replacing the term 
“national interest” (and perhaps “important public interest”) in Article 20 of the Law on 
Scientific and Technological Progress with language that provides a more reasonable and 
precise scope for exclusivity claims. 
  
12. Recommendation: Open a draft of MoST’s 12th Five-Year Special Plan on IP Work of Science 
and Technology Innovation (mentioned in Part 6, measure 59, of the 2012 National IP Strategy 
Plan) for public comments for at least 60 days.  
 
13. Recommendation: Provide full transparency into the makeup of MoST’s Patent Assessment 
Index System of National Technology Invention Awards and how that might be revised in the 
future to better foster patent quality.  
  
14. Recommendation: Revise several components of the TIER: 
 
21.1 Revise Article 27 to clearly allow negotiation on ownership of improvements on 
technology (as this may be fundamentally needed in case of technology transfer 
related to toll manufacturing and service R&D). 
 
21.2 Revise Article 2 to indicate that experimental data at an early stage of research or 
derived from pure service R&D is excluded from the approval requirements set forth in 
that article. 
 
21.3 MOFCOM and other relevant government ministries should create a working 
group with industry and other experts to improve the clarity of the coverage of 
technologies in the current category of restricted and prohibited import/export 
technology.  
 
21.4 Revise the TIER Measures provisions on liability of the technology transferor or 
licensor in an infringement claim raised by a third party. These revisions should more 
fully consider instances where current obligations create an undue burden on the 
licensor, e.g. in areas with patent thickets and where licensed technology is still not fully 
developed. 
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15. Recommendation: Ensure all overly discriminatory de jure and de facto restrictions on foreign 
entities accessing the Technical Committees in which standardisation is decided are removed, 
and more reasonable access is granted to patent pools and essential patents. The European 
Chamber, among other industry associations, should be consulted to provide a specific list of 
barriers to be removed herein.  
 
16. Recommendation: Reform the CCC Mark accreditation process in line with recent 
recommendations provided by foreign governments.  
 
17. Recommendation: Establish a Working Group with topical sub-groups made up of 
government officials, SSOs, experts, and industry representatives (foreign and domestic) to 
investigate and provide recommendations on improving standard-development and oversight 
policy in China. Policies reviewed would include information security regulations, including the 
MLPS, that may unnecessarily discourage R&D by foreigners; information restrictions on 
patent-related requirements needed for implementing standards; intentional development of 
national standards based only on the capabilities of Chinese SOEs; intentional lack of licensing 
essential patents to foreign enterprises, particularly those in the telecom industry; potentially 
disconcerting requirements involving TCM chips; IP disclosure to competitors during the 
chemical project approval process; IP leakage and other issues surrounding SFDA’s approval 
process for pharmaceuticals; and all other standardisation policies flagged as a drag on patent 
quality. Among those needed to address the aforementioned issues, recommendations to be 
considered by the Group include Key Recommendation #5 from the European Chamber’s 
2012/2013 PCR Working Group Position Paper regarding chemical plant approval, and Key 
Recommendation #6 from the European Chamber’s Standards and Conformity Assessment 
Working Group 2011/2012 Position Paper. The Group could be expanded to cover other 
concerning standardisation polices not necessarily related to patent quality. 
 
18. Recommendation: A taskforce should be created among industry associations in China 
(Chinese and foreign) to conduct an audit of all raw deals and other forms of forced-
disclosure of know-how their members have experienced. Complainants should provide solid 
evidence as to how the instances harm patent quality and innovation in China. Only the 
strongest cases should be included in a final report. The report should be published with 
recommendations and discussed with the MOFCOM, among other ministries.  
 
19. Recommendation: Implement Key Recommendation #3 in the European Chamber Position 
Paper 2011/2012 (2011) on clarifying the rules governing inventor remuneration. That 
recommendation suggests the SPC or SIPO develop and interpretation on how certain general 
questions on inventor remuneration will be handled in a dispute. Specifically, clarification is 
needed that the direct employer of the inventor under a contract bound by Chinese labour law is 
the only one liable for inventor remuneration, and that labour contracts and company 
regulations should only be challengeable in extreme cases of willful neglect of the rights of the 
inventor. 
 
20. Recommendation: In line with the European Chamber’s submission on this topic, consider at 
least very broadly clarifying certain issues with the Measures on Compulsory Licensing. 
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Ⅲ.3.3.2 Other recommendations 
 
Sub-section 3.2  
 
21. Recommendation: A taskforce of scholars, government officials, and other experts should be 
commissioned to conduct a rigorous review of the progress thus far and expected future 
results of China’s IIP polices on assimilation, absorption, co-innovation and re-innovation. The 
report should be published with recommendations and discussed with the government.  
22. Recommendation: Continue, with renewed vigor, discussions in the WTO on including non-
violation complaints in the TRIPS Agreement, with a view to removing the moratorium on use 
of these provisions. 
 
23. Recommendation: Delink EIDF and any other subsidies from preferential policies that without 
mention of procurement threshold requirements full-stop give preference in government 
procurement tendering to “large enterprises.” 
 
24. Recommendation: MoST to re-consider its current approach to innovation and patent filing 
through megaprojects. As feasible, consider having at least some of these initiatives more 
focused on basic research and key fields via highly competitive and smaller scale, peer-
reviewed projects. 
25. Recommendation: Ensure transparency regulations as stipulated in China’s WTO commitments 
are enforced, including on comment periods and notifications of measures, and ensure 
relevant measures are published in an Official Journal and in a WTO language.  
 
26. Recommendation: A formal relationship should be developed between provincial technology 
transfer centres and the European Chamber, as well as with the European Chamber and 
industrial parks in those regions, with a view to better facilitating matchmaking activities with 
European businesses and Chinese counterparts.  
27. Recommendation: Set forth guidance, with some form of penalties for non-compliance, that 
provinces/municipalities, and more so industrial parks and larger zones within a 
province/municipality, when possible and appropriate should coordinate with one another in 
determining their respective competitive advantages and developing accordingly specific plans 
to attract distinct industries/sets of companies to their industry parks. 
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13th  2011 by the Guizhou 
Intellectual Property Office 
 
Link: 
http://www.chinagzpp.cn/Article/S
howArticle.asp?ArticleID=1110 
Intellectual Property Strategy Compendium 
of Guizhou Province (2006-2015) issued on 
February 14th 2009 by the Guizhou 
Intellectual Property Office 
 
Link: 
http://www.jsip.gov.cn/news/ztbd/ztbdcs/zt
bdpd9/200902/20090214_51568.html 
 
Hainan Hainan’s 12th Five Year Plan on 
Patent Development issued on 
December 27th  2011 by the Hainan 
Intellectual Property Office 
 
Link 
http://www.hipo.gov.cn/list.asp?id
=3165 
Intellectual Property Strategy Compendium 
of Hainan Province issued on July 6th 2010 by 
the Hainan Intellectual Property Office 
 
Link: 
http://www.hipo.gov.cn/list.asp?id=2883 
 
 
 
 
Hebei Hebei’s 12th Five Year Plan on Advice on Implementation of the National 
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Patent Development issued on June 
10th  2011 by the Hebei Intellectual 
Property Office 
 
Link: 
http://218.12.44.17/content.jsp?co
de=40170382-3/2011-
00104&name 
 
Intellectual Property Strategy Compendium 
by the Hebei Province People’s Government 
issued on June 22th 2009 by the Hebei 
Province People’s Government 
 
 
Link: 
http://2010.hebstd.gov.cn/?thread-64-
1.html 
 
**2012 Major Tasks on Implementation of 
Hebei’s IP Strategy issued on April 12th 2012 
under the National Intellectual Property 
Strategy 
 
Link: 
http://www.nipso.cn/onews.asp?id=13609  
Heilongjiang None Notice  on Launching the Heilongjiang  
Intellectual Property Strategy Compendium 
by Heilongjiang Province People’s 
Government (2011-2020) issued on May 22nd 
2011 by the Heilongjiang Province People’s 
Government 
 
Link: 
http://baike.baidu.com/view/7153606.htm 
 
**Plan to Put Forward Implementation of  
Heilongjiang’s 2012 IP Strategy issued on 
February 23rd 2012  
 
Link: 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/twzb/2012hljzscq/2
012hljzscqbjzl/201202/t20120223_646396.h
tml  
 
**2012 Major Tasks on Implementation of 
Heilongjiang’s IP Strategy issued on June 4th 
2012 under the National Intellectual 
Property Strategy 
 
Link: 
http://www.nipso.cn/onews.asp?id=14235 
 
 
Henan Henan’s 12th Five Year Plan on 
intellectual Property Development 
issued on December 20th  2010 by 
the Henan Intellectual Property 
Office 
 
Intellectual Property Strategy Compendium 
of Henan Province (2008) No.59 issued on 
November 23rd 2008 by the Henan 
Intellectual Property Office 
 
Link: 
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Link: 
http://hnszscqzlw.cn/ArticleShow.a
sp?id=89 
http://www.hnpatent.gov.cn/patentwebsite
/show.do?method=show&id=3577 
 
**2012 Major Tasks on Implementation of 
Henan’s IP Strategy issued on April 12th 2012 
under the National Intellectual Property 
Strategy 
 
Link: 
http://www.nipso.cn/onews.asp?id=13599  
Hubei Hubei’s 12th Five Year Plan on 
Intellectual Property (Patent) 
Development issued on July 29th  
2011 by the Hubei Intellectual 
Property Bureau 
 
Link: 
http://www.hbipo.gov.cn/upfile/20
100729011527652.doc 
Intellectual Property Strategy Compendium 
of Hubei Province  by Hubei Province 
People’s Government issued on August 11th  
2010 by the Hubei Province People’s 
Government 
 
Link: 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/chinanews/2010
-08/25/content_20711850.htm 
http://www.hbipo.gov.cn/upfile/201103071
62744906.doc 
 
**2012 Major Tasks on Implementation of 
Hubei’s IP Strategy issued on April 12th 2012 
under the National Intellectual Property 
Strategy 
 
Link: 
http://www.nipso.cn/onews.asp?id=13598  
Hunan Hunan’s 12th Five Year Plan on 
Patent Development issued on May 
7th  2012 by the Hunan Intellectual 
Property Office and Development 
and Reform Commission of Hunan 
Province 
 
Link: 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/dtxx/zlgzd
t/2012/201205/t20120507_687187
.html 
 
Intellectual Property Strategy Compendium 
of Hunan Province  by the Hunan  Province 
People’s Government issued on March 27th  
2010 by the Hunan Province People’s 
Government 
 
Link: 
http://news.163.com/09/0327/11/55DK0BO
K000120GU.html 
 
**2012 Major Tasks on Implementation of 
Hunan’s IP Strategy issued on April 12th 2012 
under the National Intellectual Property 
Strategy. 
 
Link: 
http://www.nipso.cn/onews.asp?id=13596  
Inner 
Mongolia 
None Key points in the Implementation of the Inner 
Mongolia Autonomous Region 2012 
Intellectual Property Strategy issued on June 
4th 2012 
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Link: 
http://www.nipso.cn/onews.asp?id=14238 
 
**2012 Major Tasks on Implementation of 
Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region’s IP 
Strategy issued on June 4th 2012 under the 
National Intellectual Property Strategy 
 
Link: 
http://www.nipso.cn/onews.asp?id=14238   
Jiangsu Jiangsu’s 12th Five Year Plan on 
Patent Development issued on 
November 2nd  2011 by the 
Intellectual Property Office of 
Jiangsu Province 
 
Link: 
http://www.jsip.gov.cn/laws/bmgf
xwj/201112/20111216_70465.html 
Notice on Launching the Intellectual Property 
Strategy Compendium of Jiangsu Province  
by Jiangsu Province People’s Government 
issued on January 5th  2009 by the Jiangsu 
Province People’s Government 
 
Link: 
http://www.jsip.gov.cn/news/ywdtnews/20
0901/20090112_50874.html 
 
**2012 Major Tasks on Implementation of 
Jiangsu’s IP Strategy issued on June 4th 2012 
under the National Intellectual Property 
Strategy. 
 
Link: 
http://www.nipso.cn/onews.asp?id=14233  
Jiangxi None Call for comments on the Jiangxi Province 
Intellectual Property Strategy Compendium 
by the Intellectual Property Office of Jiangxi 
Province on April 6th 2011 
 
Link: 
http://zl.ncinfo.gov.cn/readnews.asp?id=229
2 
Jilin None **2012 Major Tasks on Implementation of 
Jilin’s IP Strategy issued on June 4th 2012 
under the National Intellectual Property 
Strategy. 
 
Link: 
http://www.nipso.cn/onews.asp?id=14236  
Liaoning Liaoning’s  12th Five Year Plan on 
Patent Development issued on 
November 15th 2011 by the 
Intellectual Property Office of 
Liaoning  
 
Link: 
http://www.lnipo.gov.cn/zscqjweb
Intellectual Property Strategy Compendium 
of Liaoning  Province  by the Liaoning 
Province People’s Government issued on 
June 8th 2011  by the Intellectual Property 
Office of Liaoning 
 
Link: 
http://www.lnipo.gov.cn/zscqjweb/zsweb/in
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/zsweb/informationShow.jsp?secto
rId=yewgh&infoId=bb45458632fb1
d2c0133a58bdb5901b8 
formationShow.jsp?sectorId=zscqzlgy&infoId
=bb4545863068d15001306d2df5070046 
 
**2012 Major Tasks on Implementation of 
Liaoning’s IP Strategy issued on April 12th 
2012 under the National Intellectual 
Property Strategy 
 
Link： 
http://www.nipso.cn/onews.asp?id=13606  
Ningxia None Notice on Launching the Intellectual Property 
Strategy Compendium of Ningxia Huizu 
Autonomous Region by Ningxia Huizu 
Autonomous Region People’s Government 
issued on September 27th  2011 by the 
Ningxia Huizu Autonomous Region People’s 
Government 
 
Link: 
http://govinfo.nlc.gov.cn/nxfz/zfgb/201120/
201111/t20111124_1144182.html?classid=4
23 
 
**2012 Major Tasks on Implementation of 
Ningxia Huizu Autonomous Region’s IP 
Strategy issued on April 12th 2012 under the 
National Intellectual Property Strategy 
 
Link: 
http://www.nipso.cn/onews.asp?id=13585  
Qinghai None Notice of Advice on Implementation of the 
National Intellectual Property Strategy 
Compendium by the Qinghai Province 
People’s Government issued on November 
19th  2008 by the Qinghai Province People’s 
Government 
 
Link: 
http://www.qhys.gov.cn/html/42/21102.ht
ml 
 
**2012 Major Tasks on Implementation of 
Qinghai’s IP Strategy issued on April 12th 
2012 under the National Intellectual-
Property Strategy 
 
Link: 
http://www.nipso.cn/onews.asp?id=13586  
Shaanxi Shaanxi’s 12th Five Year Plan on 
Intellectual Property (Patent) 
Development issued on May 20th  
Notice on Launching the Shaanxi  Intellectual 
Property Strategy Compendium (2008-2020) 
and Shaanxi  Intellectual Property Strategy 
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2011 by the Shaanxi Intellectual 
Property Office 
 
Link: 
http://www.snipo.gov.cn/ReadNew
s.asp?NewsID=11091&BigClassNam
e=%D6%AA%CA%B6%B2%FA%C8%
A8%B9%A4%D7%F7%A1%B0%CA%
AE%B6%FE%CE%E5%A1%B1%B9%E
6%BB%AE&SmallClassName=%B9%
A4%D7%F7%B6%AF%CC%AC 
Implementation Plan (2008-2010)  by the 
Shaanxi Province People’s Government 
issued on November 14th  2008 by the 
Shaanxi Province People’s Government 
 
Link: 
http://www.shaanxi.gov.cn/0/103/6295.htm 
 
Shandong Shandong’s 12th Five Year Plan on 
Patent Development issued on July 
15th  2011 by the Shandong 
Intellectual Property Office 
 
Link: 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/dfzz/shan
dong/zcfg/sjwj/201107/t20110715
_611387.htm 
Key points on the Implementation of the 
Shandong Intellectual Property Strategy 
issued on May 26th 2011  
 
Link: 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/dtxx/zlgzdt/2011/2
01105/t20110526_605561.html 
 
**2012 Major Tasks on Implementation of 
Shandong’s IP Strategy issued on April 12th 
2012 under the National Intellectual 
Property Strategy 
 
Link: 
http://www.nipso.cn/onews.asp?id=13600  
Shanghai Shanghai’s 12th Five Year Plan on 
Intellectual Property Development 
issued on November 19th 2011 by 
the Shanghai Intellectual Property 
Administration (officially published 
on Shanghai Intellectual Property  
Administration’s website on April 
16th 2012) 
 
 
Link: 
http://www.sipa.gov.cn/gb/zscq/n
ode2/node23/userobject1ai9309.h
tml 
 
Link 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/dtxx/gn/2
011/201111/t20111109_629911.ht
ml 
Notice on Drafting the Shanghai Intellectual 
Property Strategy Compendium (2011-2020) 
issued on April 8th 2011 by Shanghai 
Intellectual Property Administration 
 
Link: 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/dtxx/gn/2011/2011
04/t20110408_595729.html 
 
**2012 Major Tasks on Implementation of 
Shanghai’s IP Strategy issued on June 4th 
2012 under the National Intellectual 
Property Strategy 
 
Link: 
http://www.nipso.cn/onews.asp?id=14234  
Shanxi **A general notice by Shanxi 
Intellectual Property Office: 
Shanxi’s 12th Five Year Plan on 
Intellectual Property (Patent) 
Development issued on December 
26th  2011 by the Shanxi Intellectual 
Notice on Drafting the Shanxi Intellectual 
Property strategy Compendium issued on 
August 13th 2009 by the Department of 
Science and Technology in Shanxi 
 
Link: 
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Property Office 
 
Link: 
http://218.26.227.183:8000/zscqj/s
jdt/1451.htm 
http://www.shanxigov.cn/n16/n1611/n3539
/n7299/n20244/8365727.html 
 
**2012 Major Tasks on Implementation of 
Shanxi’s IP Strategy issued on June 4th 2012 
under the National Intellectual Property 
Strategy 
 
Link: 
http://www.nipso.cn/onews.asp?id=14239  
Sichuan None Notice on Launching the 2012 
Implementation Plan of Sichuan Intellectual 
Property Strategy by the Sichuan Province 
People’s Government (2012) No.14 issued on 
February 6th 2012 by Sichuan Intellectual 
Property Office 
 
Link: 
http://www.sc.gov.cn/zt_sczt/2012zscq/201
2zscq/201202/t20120206_1170226.shtml 
 
**Major Tasks Regarding Sichuan’s Patent 
Development for 2012 issued on February 5th 
2012 by the Sichuan Intellectual Property 
Office  
 
Link: 
http://www.sc.gov.cn/zt_sczt/2012zscq/201
2zscq/201202/t20120206_1170227.shtml 
Tianjin Tianjin’s 12th Five Year Plan on 
Intellectual Property  Development 
issued on December 23rd2011 by 
the Tianjin Intellectual Property 
Office 
 
Link: 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/dfzz/tianji
n/tzgg/201112/P020111222635593
820156.pdf 
 
Notice on Launching Tianjin’s 12th 
Five Year Plan on Patents issued on 
December 23rd 2011 by the Tianjin 
Intellectual Property Office 
 
Link: 
http://zc.k8008.com/html/tianjin/s
hizhichanju/2011/1223/131829.ht
ml 
Notice on Launching the Intellectual Property 
Strategy Compendium of Tianjin  issued on 
March 15th  2010 by the Tianjin People’s 
Government 
 
Link: 
http://www.tj.gov.cn/zwgk/wjgz/szfwj/2010
03/t20100324_115195.htm 
 
**2012 Major Tasks on Implementation of 
Tianjin’s IP Strategy  issued on June 4th 2012 
under the National Intellectual Property 
Strategy 
 
Link:  
http://www.nipso.cn/onews.asp?id=14241 
 
Tibet None Science and Technology Development Plan of 
the Tibet Autonomous Region 12th Five Year 
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Plan for Further Enacting the Intellectual 
Property Strategy (2012) No.53 issued on 
May 25th 2012 by the Tibet Autonomous 
Region People’s Government 
 
Link: 
http://www.tibetsti.gov.cn/Item.aspx?id=25
62 
 
Great Progress Made Towards Protecting 
Intellectual Property Rights in the Xizang 
Autonomous Region issued on May 29th 2011  
 
Link: 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/mtjj/2011/201105/t
20110526_605517.html 
Xinjiang None Notice on Launching the Intellectual Property 
Strategy Compendium of the Xinjiang Uygur 
Autonomous Region issued on April 19th 
2010 by the government of Xinjiang Uygur 
Autonomous Region 
 
Link: 
http://www.akss.gov.cn/childsite/kjj/index.p
hp?option=com_content&view=article&id=3
60:2010-05-10-09-03-45&catid=46:2009-04-
21-01-31-28&Itemid=77 
 
The Implementation Plan on the Intellectual 
Property Strategy Compendium of the 
Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (2011-
2015) issued on August 7th 2011 by the 
Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region 
 
Link: 
http://www.xinjiang.gov.cn/xxgk/gwgb/zfwj
/2011/81616.htm 
 
**2012 Major Tasks on Implementation of 
the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region’s IP 
Strategy issued on April 12th 2012 under the 
National Intellectual Property Strategy 
 
Link:  
http://www.nipso.cn/onews.asp?id=13584 
Yunnan Yunnan’s 12th Five Year Plan on 
Intellectual Property (Patent) 
Development issued on March 24th  
2011 by the Intellectual Property 
Office of Yunnan Province 
 
Notice on Advice for Implementation of the 
National Intellectual Property Strategy 
Compendium by Yunnan Province People’s 
Government〔2008〕No.18 issued on 
August 7th  2009 by the Yunnan Province 
People’s Government 
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†Note: readily available 2012 patent and IP development plans included in chart to provide an idea of the one year 
initiatives of provinces/municipalities ostensibly meant as an additional method of implementing the multi-year plans and 
strategies set out. ** Refers to annual (for one year) implementing measures only. 
Link: 
http://www.ynipo.gov.cn/newsvie
w.aspx?id=3074 
 
 
Link: 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/dfzz/yunnan/zcfg/zc
/200908/t20090807_471689.htm 
 
**Summary Report for the 2011 IP Work and 
Major Tasks for 2012 IP Work by the Yunnan 
Intellectual Property Office issued on 
February 15th 2012 by Yunnan Intellectual 
Property Office 
 
Link: 
http://www.ynipo.gov.cn/newsview.aspx?id
=3075  
Zhejiang Zhejiang’s 12th Five Year Plan on 
Patent Development issued on 
February 1st   2012 by the Zhejiang 
Provincial Department of 
Technology 
 
Link: 
http://www.zjkjt.gov.cn/news/nod
e01/detail0101/2012/0101_28641.
htm 
 
Notice on Advice for Implementation of the 
National Intellectual Property Strategy 
Compendium by Zhejiang Province People’s 
Government〔2009〕No.189 issued on 
December 22th  2009 by the Zhejiang 
Province People’s Government 
 
Link: 
http://www.zjpat.gov.cn/details.aspx?newsI
d=c644de29-7495-4cda-b341-2bc9b51beeb6 
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Ⅶ Annexes166 
 
 
Chapter 3 
 
Ⅶ .3.1 Example financial incentives for patent development from major 
recently promulgated sub-central IP plans and strategies 
 
Table 39: Example financial incentives for patent development from major recently promulgated 
sub-central IP plans and strategies 
                                                        
166 Special thanks to both Ruben Moen, Working Group Assistant at the European Chamber, for his help in compiling some 
of the statistics in this Annex; and to Linjia Dai, Working Group Assistant at the European Chamber, for her help in double-
checking many of the statistics and some translations provided in this Annex and the body of this study.  
 
Province/ 
Municipality/ 
Autonomous Region  
Financial support for patent development from 12th Five Year IP Plans, other 
equivalent plans , Provincial IP Strategies and other equivalent plans 
Anhui  IP Plan issued in 2011: 
Section 4, Part 3, Article 9: “Increasing support for industrialisation of patent 
technology to establish special funds for patent utilisation and patent 
industrialisation, set-up the Anhui Patent Award to improve the patent output 
quality and levels of industrialisation. Establishing a pilot base for patent 
industrialisation, carrying out the pilot support for patent ventures to promote 
the entrepreneurship of non-service inventors and SMEs.”  
 
Section 5, Para. 2: “Establishing the continuously increasing mechanism of 
financial supporting intellectual property budget. Strengthening the 
management of special funds for patent development… Do an excellent job of 
subsidising foreign patent applications.” 
Hebei  IP Plan issued in 2011: 
Section 3, Part 2, Para. 2: “Accelerate the establishment of the government-
guided, project-driven patent boosting system. Continue to increase the financial 
input to enterprises and institutions based on their differences in area, size 
and development stage…”  
 
Section 4, Part 2: “Increase financial investment in the major work of the Hebei 
12th Five Year Intellectual Property Plan, and make adjustments 
according to the annual work priorities. Promote that the government at all 
levels, industry sectors and enterprises, increase patent funding Inputs and 
guide commercial financial institutions to support the patent commercialisation 
and industrialisation, and gradually establish and improve a diversified and 
multi-channel of IP funding input system which is market-oriented and recognise 
enterprises as the mainstay.” 
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Jiangsu  IP Plan issued in 2011: 
Section 2, Part 2: “Promoting the award polices of indigenous invention, 
establish government procurement of patent products, explore a new incentive 
and allocation mechanism of patent transformation…” 
 
Section 4, Part 3, Para. 3: “Exploring the establishment of a patented operating 
mechanism. Explore the establishment of Patent Bank, research on the 
establishment of Patent Bank operating and distribution of benefits mechanism. 
Establish special Patent Bank funds. Actively encourage, guide and support input 
by private capital and other social resources into Patent Banks.” 
 
Section 4, Part 2: “Optimising the subsidisation and awarding system of patents. 
Verify and improve the ‘Jiangsu Management Measures on Provincial Subsidy 
Funds,’ promulgate the ‘Jiangsu Patent Award Measure’, stimulating inventions 
and improving patent output quality.”  
 
Section 5, Part 2: “Increasing the maximum amount of patent rewards, and 
strengthening the rewards to outstanding patents/inventors and enterprises 
with standardisation of IP management. After registering the relevant patent 
technology transaction contracts, the income of patent intermediary service 
organistions engaged in patent technology development, transfer, licensing and 
other related consulting services, can be exempted from the business tax and 
education surcharge. Increase the amount of patent awards, and increase the 
award efforts of excellent patents, excellent inventors and excellent intellectual 
property management of standardised enterprises.” 
 
Section 5, Part 3: “Increasing the financial fund input into patents, establish 
special funds for patent. Establish the stably increasing mechanism of financially 
supporting intellectual property budget, realising the financial investment 
growth rate should be significantly higher than the regular financial revenue 
growth. Increasing grants for invention patent applications and patents granted, 
particularly for invention patents granted. Increase the financial investment on 
the areas including patent services, overseas rights protection, personnel 
training, industry early warning mechanisms. Promote the existing special funds 
of science and technology, education, culture, industry, trade and other areas to 
tilt to the development of patents…”  
Liaoning  IP Plan issued in 2011: 
Section 3, Part 2, para. 3: “Improving the reward system for intellectual property.  
Put ‘the year-on-year growth rate of China invention patent applications’ into 
the government performance evaluation system. Enforcing a special government 
incentive system for intellectual property, providing institutions with the Gold 
Award for China Patents a one-time award of 500,000 RMB and providing the 
institutions with the China Patent Excellence Award with a one-time award of 
200,000 RMB. Formulating municipal and county award measures based on local 
practice. ”  
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Ningxia  IP Strategy issued in 2011: 
Section 5, Part5, Article 38: “Increase capital investment in intellectual 
property work. Increase financial investment in intellectual property work, 
promote various types of intellectual property pilot and demonstration 
projects, cultivate projects with IPR of advantageous enterprises, an intellectual 
property-focused county (city, district), engineering, intellectual 
property, implementation and industrialisation of intellectual property, 
information construction of intellectual property and so on. Establishing special 
funds for invention patent application and maintenance to promote the dramatic 
increase of the number of invention patents owned in Ningxia. Municipalities, 
counties (districts) can increase the financial input for intellectual property 
work according to the economic and social development needs and 
local financial situation to promote regional intellectual property. Establishing an 
intellectual property award mechanism to reward patent technologies, patent 
products and patent inventors. Award the institutions who win the Gold Award 
for China Patents, China Patent Excellence Awards and any other national 
intellectual property awards. Set up the distribution of benefits and reward 
system of intellectual property rights in enterprises and institutions. Award the 
inventors, designers, and promotion and service staff who make contribution in 
the process of intellectual property creation, utilisation and promotion.”  
Shandong  IP Plan issued in 2011:  
Section 3, Part 7, Para. 2: “Increase financial input. Actively see that all levels of 
government further increase the input of patent work, and universally establish 
special funds for patent development in governments at or above the county 
level. Establish a patent reward system, providing recognition awards to 
excellent indigenous innovation projects with significant economic and social 
benefits, as well as to the institutions and individuals who make outstanding 
contributions to the creation and utilisation of patents...”  
Shanghai  IP Plan issued in 2011:  
Section3, Part1, Article 1: “Improve the ‘Shanghai Patent Subsidy Measures’ and 
formulate the ‘Shanghai Reward Measures for Invention Patents’ to further 
optimise the patent application structure and to reward significant inventions…”  
Sichuan  IP Strategy issued in 2009: 
Section 5, Part 3, Article 1: “…Increase financial support and reward 
efforts for invention patents …. Improve the bonus and payment system of 
service invention-creations”. 
 
Section 5, Part 3, Article 2: “Encourage the use and 
industrialisation of intellectual property rights. Strengthen the guiding role of 
government funds for the commercialisation and industrialisation of intellectual 
property, and continuously improve the quantity and use efficiency of special 
funds for patent. Use fiscal, financial, investment, and government 
procurement policies and industry, energy, environmental protection policies to 
guide the patent utilisation of enterprises and institutions. Establish a 
government procurement mechanism and prior purchase polices for important 
equipment and products with indigenous intellectual property rights belonging 
to enterprises and institutions. Encourage financial institutions and venture 
capitalists to increase funds for the commercial utilisation of intellectual 
property.” 
Tianjin  IP Plan issued in 2011:  
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Source: Review of provincial/municipal 12th Five Year IP Plans, recent IP Strategies, and equivalent plans and strategies. 
Note: This is only intended as a sample, i.e. it is a non-exhaustive list of financial incentives from all of these plans. Also, 
there may be other articles within the policies cited herein that are not mentioned hereto but also relate in some ways to 
patent-related financial incentives. Translations are from the European Chamber thus are unofficial.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 4, Part 6, Article 1: “Improving patent quantity and quality … enacting 
the “Tianjin Implementation Measures on the Ownership and the Bonus and 
Payment System of Service Invention-Creations.” Implement the “One award, 
Two rewards” system and other relevant regulations. Encourage annual growth 
rates of enterprise patent applications up to 20%.” 
 
Section 5, Part2: “Increasing municipal financial funds on intellectual property, 
establishing special funds for intellectual property at the district and county 
level. …Greatly developing IPR pledge financing, IPR insurance and other 
financial innovations to shape a multi-channel IP funding input system. A certain 
proportion of the financial fund input of key scientific research projects and 
major technological transformation projects should be put into the management 
of intellectual property rights…” 
Section 5, Article 3: “Greatly publicise and recognise the institutions and 
individuals who contribute outstandingly to the field of intellectual property, 
strengthening the influence of awards such as the “Tianjin Patent Award,” 
“Worker Inventor Award,” “Women Inventor Award,” and “Juvenile Inventor 
Award.” Setting forth a wide distribution of awards including taking shares in the 
form of intellectual property rights; accelerating the forming of a new 
distribution system which will stimulate inventions and the implementation of 
patent transformation.” 
 
Section 5, Article 4: “…Strengthen the significance of intellectual property in 
science and technology awards …Special funds such as the key technology 
invention project fund, science and technology invention fund, technology 
invention fund for technological SMEs, and government financial funds should 
tilt towards enterprises with indigenous intellectual property rights. ” 
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Some other issues 
 
Some other (non-exhaustive list of) issues and recommendations flagged for 
inclusion but ultimately not included in the body of the report 
 
Explanatory note: While numerous issues were vetted for further analysis in this study and 
ultimately not included, the following issues were even more seriously considered for potential 
inclusion in the body of this paper although were also ultimately not included. (Reasons for not 
including such issues include that perhaps while problematic in their own right, they either do not 
appear to notably drag down patent quality in China; and/or there is not sufficient evidence for 
these practices to warrant them being highlighted in the body of the paper; and/or they are notably 
diverging views on if the issue mentioned is a problem and/or how it should be addressed.) 
 
 
Inventor clawback 
 
Issue: Other countries do not have rigid rules on inventor “clawback” like China. Like non-compete 
agreements, this rule reduces labor mobility although also reduces IPR misappropriation. The basis 
for such rules is listed in the following:  
 
Article 11 of the Implementation Regulations of PRC Patent Law (“Implementing Regulations”) sets 
forth the invention clawback regulation in the PRC.  
 
Under Article 6 of PRC Patent Law, if an invention is made by a person in execution of the tasks of 
the entity to which he belongs, or made by him mainly by using the material and technical means of 
the entity, then the invention is a service invention and its ownership should belong to the entity.  
 
Article 11 of the Implementing Regulations further details the circumstances prescribed in Article 
6.  As to “made by a person in execution of the tasks of the entity to which he belongs,” Article 11 
specifically prescribes that such an invention also refers to those which are made “within one year 
from his resignation, retirement or change of work, where the invention-creation relates to his own 
duty or the other task entrusted to him by the entity to which he previously belonged.”167   
 
Recommendation: Amend these rules to be more in-line with international practice. 
 
 
 
Concerns with SAC’s Patent Policy Proposal and CNIS’ Patent Disposal Rules 
 
Issue: A variety of concerns surround two particular rules governing essential patents in China: the 
Disposal Rules for Inclusion of Patents in National Standards (“Patent Disposal Rules”), issued for 
comment on January 21st 2010 by the China National Institute of Standardisation (CNIS)168 (and still 
undergoing review) and a measure to which it closely relates, the Proposed Regulations for the 
Administration of the Formulation and Revision of the Patent-Involving National Standards (“SAC 
Patent Policy Proposal”), issued by the Standards Administration of China (SAC), on November 2nd 
2009.169 As identified by Willingmyre (2009), a range of problems with the wording of the SAC Patent 
                                                        
167 19 May 2012 - Consultations with Tony Chen, Partner, Jones Day, Shanghai. Note: in addition to the inventor clawback 
provision, the “work for hire” clause in Chinese law reduces IPR misappropriation. 
168 Source retrieved from http://wenku.baidu.com/view/db481c15f18583d049645981.html 
169 Retrieved from http://www.sac.gov.cn/upload/091104/0911040916193480.PDF 
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Policy Proposal, particularly regarding treatment of compulsory licensing in Articles 12, 13 and 15 
and Article 9, potentially drag down patent owners’ ability to monetise and receive a reasonable 
ROI.170 As identified by Willingmyre (2010), while there are some positive provisions in the Patent 
Disposal Rules, there are still some uncertainties, including the lack of distinction between “essential 
patents” and “essential patent claims,” lack of clarity that a declaration form is not a license, and 
lack of clarity on certain disclosure obligations.171 Collectively, these shortcomings promote inferior 
technologies and/or unnecessarily costly implementation for important standards, and may 
discourage the usage of innovative technologies and related quality patents in international 
standards. 
 
Recommendation: As suggested in Willingmyre (2010), revise the SAC Patent Policy Proposal, 
particularly regarding treatment of compulsory licensing in Articles 12, 13 and 15 and Article 9. 
Specifically, clarify uncertainties over the lack of distinction between “essential patents” and 
“essential patent claims,” lack of clarity that a declaration form is not a license, and lack of clarity on 
certain disclosure obligations.  
 
 
R&D Centre requirements 
 
Issue: The Chinese government employs a wide-range of incentives, for example tax incentives, to 
spur innovation through R&D centres which are directly and indirectly intended to encourage 
patents. These include the ability to be recognised as a qualified R&D Centre if meeting certain legal 
entity, capital and other (in certain situations employment threshold) requirements. If meeting these 
criteria, enterprises can qualify for exemption of customs duties and import VAT exemptions on 
imported equipment, and a Value-added Tax (VAT) refund for certain domestically-purchased 
equipment. Also, they can receive an EIT exemption on income up to RMB 5 million of transferred 
income on “self-developed” technology and related services, and a 50% reduction of tax on this type 
of income above the aforementioned threshold.172  A range of other tax incentives may be available.  
 
There are some concerns among foreign business about the “overly strict” legal entity and capital 
requirements for becoming an “R&D Centre,”173 in China which may in-turn, albeit indirectly, harm 
innovation and patent quality development in China. Specifically, these requirements may in effect 
limit the ability of operations of foreign enterprises to produce quality patents given they are denied 
access to collaborative networks and financial incentives even though they are just as capable as 
other legally represented entities in innovating and producing quality patents.  
 
Recommendation: Revise the overly strict legal entity and capital requirements for becoming an 
official R&D Centre to better allow otherwise qualified affiliates to establish an R&D Centre in China. 
 
                                                        
170 Willingmyre, George T. “Take Two: China’s Proposed Regulations for Patent-Involving National Standards.” Intellectual 
Property Watch Magazine. December 21st 2009. http://www.ip-watch.org/2009/12/21/take-two-china%E2%80%99s-
proposed-regulations-for-patent-involving-national-standards/. Note, also see: 
http://www.ipo.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=24603 
171 Willingmyre, George T. “China’s Latest Draft Disposal Rules for Patents in Standards: A Step Forward?”April 1st 2010.  
Intellectual Property Watch Magazine. http://www.ip-watch.org/2010/04/01/china%E2%80%99s-latest-draft-disposal-
rules-for-patents-in-standards-a-step-forward/ 
172 Chan and Liu (2012). Note: Companies operating entities not necessarily qualified as an R&D Centre but in certain 
industries favored by China’s Foreign Investment Catalogue may receive some preferential tax treatment similar to these.  
173 Whereas there are different arguably high threshold requirements for registered capital, and for independent legal 
persons vs. branches and departments of a company. Source: concerns raised by a member of the European Chamber in 
January 2012. 
